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INTRODUCTION 
During the twentieth century, the United States Supreme Court came to be 
seen both by legal scholars and the public as the government institution most 
responsive to the needs of the politically alienated and disenfranchised. 
Decisions from the famous footnote four of United States v. Carolene Products 
Co.2 to such high points of Warren Court activism as Brown v. Board of 
Education3 and Miranda v. Arizona,4 and even such twenty-first century 
decisions as Lawrence v. Texas,5 cemented the public’s perception of the Court 
as willing to challenge the political majority on behalf of disadvantaged 
minorities and to remake American political culture into a more egalitarian 
mold. But to what extent does this mythic Court—this efficacious David 
defending constitutional principles against the Goliath of popular prejudice—
resemble the Court of historical reality? How can a Court constrained by 
significant institutional limitations and lacking the power to effectively enforce 
its decisions without the cooperation of the elected branches impose its policy 
preferences upon an unwilling public? In this Article, we explore those aspects 
of judicial power that enable the Court to achieve measurable social change 
even in the most politically adverse circumstances. Using the public’s response 
to the Court’s controversial decisions prohibiting prayer and Bible reading in 
public classrooms and extracurricular events to examine broader issues of 
judicial capacity, we suggest underappreciated aspects of the Court’s ability to 
generate significant social change that necessitate substantial revisions to the 
prevailing scholarly conceptions of judicial power. In short, we find, contrary 
to the existing scholarly consensus, that the Court has a variety of mechanisms 
with which to compel compliance with its decisions even in the face of strong 
public opposition and in the absence of significant support from the other 
branches of government. 
The academic debate surrounding the Supreme Court’s ability to 
implement social change through the exercise of judicial power can be divided 
roughly between advocates of the “Constrained Court” view and advocates of 
the “Dynamic Court” view. The Constrained Court model denies the Court’s 
ability to achieve substantial compliance with its directives in the absence of 
assistance from the elected branches, whereas the Dynamic Court model views 
the constraints on the Court as less restrictive and its ability to successfully 
intervene in matters of public policy as consequently more robust.6 Though 
these views diverge under a variety of circumstances, they find common 
 
 2. United States v. Carolene Prod. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). 
 3. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 4. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
 5. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
 6. See GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL 
CHANGE? 15–16, 23–25 (2d ed. 2008). 
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ground in their belief that the Court’s capacity to achieve genuine social 
change through the exercise of judicial power is weakest when its decisions 
lack the support of the elected branches of government and face significant 
public opposition. 
The Court’s decisions enforcing a separation between public education and 
religious observation under the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment 
provide a useful context within which to test the prevailing models’ predictions 
that the Court will be ineffectual when faced with public and governmental 
opposition. A historical examination of the impact of the Court’s rulings in the 
area of devotional practice in schools reveals that both the Dynamic and 
Constrained Court models underestimate the degree to which the Court can 
effectively produce change in the most unfavorable circumstances. The Court’s 
decisions in these cases, including Engle v. Vitale,7 Abington School District v. 
Schempp,8 Wallace v. Jaffree,9 Lee v. Weisman,10 and Santa Fe Independent 
School District v. Doe,11 have endured sharp criticism from the elected 
branches and enduring opposition from the public. Thus, both the Constrained 
and Dynamic Court models would predict that the Court’s ability to achieve 
compliance with these decisions would be quite limited. However, empirical 
evidence suggests, first, that the Court’s ability to produce widespread social 
change through the exercise of judicial power is more potent than the 
Constrained Court model predicts, and, second, that the mechanisms by which 
the Court does so are more diverse than is accounted for by the most 
systematic articulation of the Dynamic Court view. 
The surprising level of public compliance with the religion cases 
challenges basic assumptions about the institutional constraints that define the 
Supreme Court’s role in the American political system and demonstrates the 
Court’s ability to motivate unpopular changes in social practice. The degree to 
which the Court through its decisions can penetrate society is limited by both 
external constraints on its power, such as resistance from the elected branches, 
and internal or institutional limitations, such as the Justices’ inability to 
implement their own orders.12 The seemingly inexplicable degree of public 
 
 7. Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962). 
 8. Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963). 
 9. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985). 
 10. Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992). 
 11. Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000). 
 12. Ronald Kahn & Ken I. Kersch, Introduction to THE SUPREME COURT & AMERICAN 
POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT 1, 17–18 (Ronald Kahn & Ken I. Kersch eds., 2006). To be sure, the 
Court can impact constitutional and political development indirectly, for example, through the 
dynamics of path dependency and sequencing. Howard Gillman, Party Politics and 
Constitutional Change: The Political Origins of Liberal Justice Activism, in THE SUPREME 
COURT & AMERICAN POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT 138, 158–59 (Ronald Kahn & Ken I. Kersch 
eds., 2006). 
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compliance with the Court’s cases concerning prayer and religious observation 
in public schools, however, suggests that the Court may be a more efficacious 
governing institution than previous scholarship has recognized. 
This Article proceeds as follows. In Part I, we describe the Constrained 
Court and Dynamic Court models, exploring their historical origins and 
establishing what each model would predict with respect to the religion-in-
schools cases. Part II surveys the Supreme Court’s contemporary 
Establishment Clause and Free Exercise Clause jurisprudence. Part III 
summarizes the responses to the school prayer decisions,13 as well as empirical 
studies of compliance with those rulings. In Part IV, we present our analysis of 
the data described in the previous section and discuss the implications of our 
analysis for the contemporary scholarly debate over the nature of judicial 
power. Through this illustration of the Court’s power to generate social 
change, we aim to demonstrate the limitations of the prevailing models and to 
further the literature on the relationship between the Court and American 
political development. Part V identifies shortcomings in the prevailing models, 
particularly their inability to account for the Court’s relative success in 
achieving compliance with the school prayer decisions, and suggests additional 
mechanisms of judicial power that those models ignore. Part VI concludes. 
I.  FRAMING THE DEBATE: MODELS OF JUDICIAL POWER 
Americans have debated the propriety of a “supreme court” since the 
founding era, disagreeing primarily over whether such a court would be a weak 
or powerful influence in American government and, often in the same analysis, 
whether it would preserve or threaten the republican form of government 
established by the federal Constitution. Beginning with the Constitutional 
Convention in 1787 and continuing until the Constitution was ratified in 1789, 
the Federalists defended the need for a federal judiciary, arguing that the 
proposed Court would be of great practical importance in resolving disputes 
among the branches of the federal government, but of little harm to state 
sovereignty. The Court would be innocuous in this respect because it was weak 
by design. In Federalist 78, Alexander Hamilton famously referred to the 
judiciary as the “least dangerous” branch of the national government 
established by the proposed Constitution.14 The judiciary “has no influence 
over either the sword or the purse; no direction either of the strength or of the 
wealth of the society, and can take no active resolution whatever.”15 Wielding 
 
 13. While this series of decisions deals with some devotional activities that do not 
specifically include prayer, such as Bible reading and moments of silence, we shall frequently 
refer to this set of decisions as “school prayer” decisions, as prayer is a recurring theme and this 
line of jurisprudence has been popularly known as such. 
 14. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 464 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). 
 15. Id. 
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“neither force nor will, but merely judgment,” the federal courts would be 
dependent on the voluntary cooperation of the legislative and executive 
branches to enforce their edicts.16 
In opposition to the Federalists’ minimalist depiction of judicial power 
under Article III of the proposed Constitution, Anti-Federalists such as New 
York Judge Robert Yates, who is generally thought to have been writing as 
“Brutus,”17 argued that the proposed Supreme Court would be a more powerful 
institution than the Federalists acknowledged, and, thus, inherently dangerous 
to state sovereignty.18 Yates argued that the Supreme Court, which would be 
comprised of men “tenacious of power,” would want to “give such a meaning 
to the constitution in all cases where it can possibly be done, as [would] 
enlarge the sphere of their own authority.”19 Thus, the Supreme Court could be 
expected to sustain all federal usurpations of state power, for the Supreme 
Court would benefit from all federal usurpations of state power. As Brutus 
reasoned, “Every extension of the power of the general legislature, as well as 
of the judicial powers, will increase the powers of the courts; and the dignity 
and importance of the judges, will be in proportion to the extent and magnitude 
of the powers they exercise.”20 The Justices of the Supreme Court “are 
independent of the people, of the legislature, and of every power under heaven. 
Men placed in this situation will generally soon feel themselves independent of 
heaven itself.”21 
Although the days of the Federalists and Anti-Federalists are long gone, 
their debate about the extent of judicial power under Article III, and its 
capacity to undermine democracy, continues to the present day. Using 
empirical methods to study the impact of the Court’s decisions on society, 
contemporary scholars continue to debate the capacity of the Court to impose 
its will upon the democratically elected branches of state and federal 
government or upon the American public generally. Adherents of the 
Constrained Court view characterize the Supreme Court as “weak, ineffective, 
and powerless” with respect to promoting social change and protecting 
insulated minorities.22 For that reason, Robert Dahl claimed in a seminal article 
that it is “somewhat naive to assume that the Supreme Court either would or 
could play the role of Galahad” by protecting vulnerable minorities against 
 
 16. Id. 
 17. See William Jeffrey, Jr., The Letters of “Brutus”: A Neglected Element in the 
Ratification Campaign of 1787–88, 40 U. CIN. L. REV. 643, 644–45 (1971). 
 18. Brutus, Essays of Brutus No. 11, in THE ESSENTIAL FEDERALIST AND ANTI-FEDERALIST 
PAPERS 81, 84 (David Wootton ed., 2003). 
 19. Id. at 85. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Brutus, Essays of Brutus No. 15, in THE ESSENTIAL FEDERALIST AND ANTI-FEDERALIST 
PAPERS 92, 93 (David Wootton ed., 2003). 
 22. ROSENBERG, supra note 6, at 3. 
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political elites.23 This is so, Dahl argued, because Supreme Court nominees are 
invariably persons of high public standing whose views are subject to close 
scrutiny by the President and Congress during the nomination process and, 
therefore, can be expected to act consistently with the policy preferences of the 
incumbent political regime.24 Moreover, historical evidence demonstrates that 
the Court lacks the institutional capacity to resist a determined Congress on 
matters of policy.25 Constitutional review might permit the Court to prevail on 
an issue about which Congress is divided or indifferent, but Dahl’s review of 
instances in which the Court had declared a federal statute unconstitutional 
indicated that Congress almost always prevails on “important” policy matters, 
although the Court’s intervention may delay that victory by up to twenty-five 
years.26 
While Dahl’s principal skepticism was directed toward the Supreme 
Court’s desire to challenge the status quo on behalf of the politically 
powerless, later scholars have been more skeptical of its ability to effect 
significant change. Gerald Rosenberg, the leading modern advocate of the 
Constrained Court view, examines the empirical effects of a number of 
landmark Supreme Court decisions, including Brown v. Board of Education,27 
Roe v. Wade,28 and Baker v. Carr,29 to determine whether the Court’s 
constitutional directives in those cases were actually successful at achieving 
“significant social reform.”30 Rosenberg identifies three institutional 
constraints that must be overcome and four independently sufficient 
conditions, at least one of which must be met, in order for the Supreme Court 
to effectively produce social change.31 The overall effect of these constraints 
 
 23. Robert A. Dahl, Decision-Making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as a National 
Policy-Maker, 6 EMORY J. PUB. L. 279, 284 (1957). 
 24. Id. at 284–85. 
 25. Id. at 286, 288, 290. 
 26. Id. at 290–91. 
 27. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 28. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
 29. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962). 
 30. ROSENBERG, supra note 6, at 2. Rosenberg defines “[significant] social reform” 
somewhat narrowly as “the broadening and equalizing of the possession and enjoyment of what 
are commonly perceived as basic goods in American society” at a scope sufficient to result in 
“policy change with nationwide impact.” Id. at 4 (emphasis omitted). 
 31. Id. at 13, 15, 21, 33, 35. The three institutional constraints that Rosenberg identifies are: 
“(1) The bounded nature of constitutional rights prevents courts from hearing or effectively acting 
on many significant social reform claims, and lessens the chances of popular mobilization . . . . 
(2) The judiciary lacks the necessary independence from the other branches of the government to 
produce significant social reform . . . . (3) Courts lack the tools to readily develop appropriate 
policies and implement decisions ordering significant social reform.” Id. at 13, 15, 21. If each of 
those three constraints is overcome in a particular case, Rosenberg argues that courts can become 
effective agents of social change only if at least one of the following four independently sufficient 
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and conditions is that “U.S. courts can almost never be effective producers of 
significant social reform.”32 
In opposition to the Constrained Court advocates’ claim that the Supreme 
Court can “almost never” achieve significant social change in the absence of 
active assistance from the other branches of the federal government, the 
Dynamic Court model of judicial power views the federal courts as “powerful, 
vigorous, and potent proponents of change,” capable of “protecting minorities 
and defending liberty, in the face of opposition from the democratically elected 
branches.”33 Proponents of this model emphasize the Court’s insulation from 
political pressure and resultant ability to defend the rights of unpopular or 
otherwise vulnerable minorities against tyrannical majorities.34 Moreover, 
Dynamic Court adherents like Lawrence Baum and Matthew E. K. Hall have 
challenged the assertion that the judicial branch is subordinate by design to the 
policy preferences of the incumbent political regime. Lawrence Baum, for 
instance, notes that the unprecedented expansion of judicial power during the 
Warren Court era seems to call into question Dahl’s conclusion that the Court 
generally acts only as an agent of the dominant national lawmaking coalition: 
For one thing, the Court’s role of protecting constitutional rights might make it 
uniquely receptive to the arguments of interests such as racial minority groups 
and political fringe groups. Further, conventional political power was less 
relevant to the Supreme Court than to other government bodies, because the 
Court’s relative insulation from political forces allowed it to respond more 
even-handedly to the quality of legal arguments.35 
Further, in response to the Constrained Court model’s emphasis on the 
institutional constraints on the judiciary’s ability to compel compliance with its 
mandates, Baum suggests that Constrained Court advocates implausibly 
assume that the other branches of government are able to attain perfect 
compliance with their own dictates: 
[T]he early research [on the capacity of the court to effect social change] 
typically treated implementation of Supreme Court decisions as a unique 
phenomenon. Scholarship on imperfect hierarchy elsewhere in government . . . 
had little impact on the judicial research. As a consequence, judicial scholars 
seldom considered whether noncompliance with Supreme Court decisions 
 
conditions is satisfied: “(1) [O]ther actors offer positive incentives to induce compliance . . . . (2) 
[O]ther actors impose costs to induce compliance . . . . (3) [J]udicial decisions can be 
implemented by the market . . . . (4) [When courts provide] leverage, or a shield, cover, or excuse, 
for persons crucial to implementation who are willing to act.” Id. at 33, 35. 
 32. ROSENBERG, supra note 6, at 422 (emphasis added). 
 33. Id. at 2, 15. 
 34. Id. at 2. 
 35. Lawrence Baum, The Supreme Court in American Politics, 6 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 161, 
170 (2003). 
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resulted chiefly from universal imperfections in implementation rather than 
special weaknesses of courts.36 
Likewise, Matthew E. K. Hall, the most recent expositor of the Dynamic 
Court view and the one who has offered the most theoretically comprehensive 
defense of that model, argues that courts are most effective at achieving 
compliance when their decisions are “popular” with the public and “vertical” 
(rather than “lateral”); that is, they can be implemented by lower judicial actors 
rather than non-judicial officials or private individuals.37 Applying this model 
of judicial power, Hall concludes that courts are most likely to achieve 
compliance when their rulings immunize some group or activity from 
government prosecution. The core of judicial power, according to Hall, lies in 
“neither the sword nor the purse, but the keys” to society’s prisons.38 In other 
words, the Court’s hierarchical control over the state and federal judicial 
apparatus bestows upon it the ability to categorically immunize individuals and 
groups from governmental prosecution, thus constraining the elected branches’ 
ability to regulate behavior through criminal punishment.39 
Notwithstanding their deep disagreements regarding the scope of judicial 
power, both models agree that at least some circumstances exist in which the 
Court is incapable of bringing about significant social change. Adherents of 
both the Constrained Court and Dynamic Court models claim that the Supreme 
Court’s ability to achieve compliance with its decisions is at its nadir where the 
Court’s decision is both broadly unpopular and lacks the active support of one 
or both of the other branches of the federal government. Rosenberg, for 
example, argues that the Court is constrained by its lack of “necessary 
independence” from the other branches of the federal government and by its 
lack of policy expertise, and further that in those rare instances in which these 
constraints are overcome, the Court may be an effective agent of change only 
where (1) its decisions enjoy support from the other branches of government in 
the form of either offering incentives or imposing costs to induce compliance; 
(2) its decisions may be implemented directly by the market without 
governmental action; or (3) its decisions produce political “cover” for other 
actors who are willing to pursue the Court’s agenda.40 Hall, on the other hand, 
emphasizes the verticality and popularity of the decision as predictive of its 
success.41 Both Rosenberg and Hall agree, then, that a judicial decision is least 
likely to achieve widespread compliance where it is generally unpopular and 
lacks the support of the elected branches. 
 
 36. Id. at 172. 
 37. MATTHEW E. K. HALL, THE NATURE OF SUPREME COURT POWER 156 (2011). 
 38. Id. at 156–57. 
 39. Id. at 164–65. 
 40. ROSENBERG, supra note 6, at 13, 15, 21, 33, 35. 
 41. HALL, supra note 37, at 156. 
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Given this point of agreement, both models would predict that the Court’s 
decisions concerning prayer and devotional activities in public schools would 
be limited in their reach. As we shall see, the Court’s initial decisions 
prohibiting prayer in the public schools were among the most controversial of 
the Warren Court era and have remained consistently unpopular to the present 
day.42 Unable to rely on lower judicial officers to enforce compliance directly, 
the Court’s decisions placed responsibility on state school officials and 
teachers—many of whom were personally opposed to its decisions and many 
others of whom had ample political incentive to defer to popular sentiment 
against the Court’s separationist vision—to enact the policy changes necessary 
to implement the Court’s decisions. The school prayer decisions also have 
never enjoyed more than minimal support from the elected branches—indeed, 
politicians have spent far more time criticizing the Court’s decisions in this 
area and attempting to overrule them via constitutional amendment than 
speaking in their favor.43 Under such circumstances, both the Constrained and 
Dynamic Court models would expect the Court to make little progress in its 
effort to alter actual religious practices in American public classrooms. 
A closer examination of the response to the school prayer decisions, 
however, reveals a more complicated picture. Although the Court’s decisions 
certainly did not put an immediate end to prayer and Bible reading in many of 
the public schools that had historically engaged in such practices, they did 
achieve a level of compliance that defies both models’ predictions.44 As Baum 
asks, “Was it more remarkable that so many schools maintained religious 
exercises prohibited by the Court or that so many others eliminated exercises 
that had strong public support?”45 Under the prevailing views of judicial 
power, the answer to Baum’s question is clearly the latter. None of 
Rosenberg’s conditions are present in the school prayer cases, and to the extent 
the Court has acted “independently” of the elected branches in charting the 
path of its school prayer jurisprudence, it has done so in the face of significant 
opposition and criticism.46 Likewise, Hall’s Dynamic Court model predicts that 
the Court’s school prayer decisions should receive relatively low compliance: 
the decisions were deeply unpopular, they are, in Hall’s parlance, “lateral” 
rather than “vertical” (that is, they require cooperation by non-judicial actors 
for implementation), and they require affirmative alterations to established 
patterns of behavior outside the courtroom rather than a simple discontinuance 
of criminal prosecution.47 Yet the empirical evidence shows a greater degree of 
 
 42. See infra Part II. 
 43. See id. 
 44. See infra Parts III–IV. 
 45. Baum, supra note 35, at 172. 
 46. See ROSENBERG, supra note 6, at 13–21. 
 47. See HALL, supra note 37, at 130–36. 
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compliance with these decisions than can be readily accounted for even by 
Hall’s articulation of the Dynamic Court model. Hall himself partially 
acknowledges this, recognizing that the high degree of compliance with the 
Court’s religion in school cases in the Northeast “is difficult to explain” under 
his model and perhaps “suggest[s] that the Court is even more powerful than 
[his] theory suggests.”48 In short, neither the Constrained Court view nor the 
Dynamic Court view seems capable of explaining the relative success that the 
Court’s school prayer decisions have enjoyed.49 
 
 48. Id. at 136. In our view, Hall overstates the extent to which the patterns of compliance in 
regions outside the Northeast are consistent with the predictions of his theory. We need not dwell 
on this point; as we discuss at greater length below, we find the larger picture of imperfect but 
substantial compliance in the face of widespread opposition in every national region more 
significant to our inquiry than the variations on that theme among the regions. 
 49. It is worth noting here that the very notion of “compliance”—a concept that is critical to 
the arguments of both the Constrained Court and Dynamic Court views—is problematic under 
both models. One problem with assessing compliance with the Court’s decisions in the school 
prayer cases is that the assessment depends on the assessor’s threshold determination about what 
the Court’s decision was meant to achieve. What the justices intend their decisions to achieve is 
subjective and thus unknowable, however. Thus, Malcolm Feeley has pointed out that a 
fundamental problem with Rosenberg’s formulation of the problem of compliance is that he uses 
“exaggerated expectations [of activist lawyers whose declarations were ‘uttered in the heat of 
battle’] as ‘the’ goal of the courts” and therefore “makes it relatively easy to expose the great gap 
between the goal and the reality of subsequent events, to show that the goal was not reached or 
that it was reached by roads other than those paved by the courts.” Malcolm M. Feeley, Hollow 
Hopes, Flypaper, and Metaphors, 17 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 745, 748 (1992). This same criticism 
can be leveled at advocates of the Dynamic Court view, who may understate the Court’s goal in 
any given case and thus lower the bar for total compliance with the Court’s order. The line 
between “minimal compliance” and “resistance” to a Court’s decision is a critical one for the 
study of judicial capacity, yet it is ill defined conceptually and often resides within a zone of 
interpretive indeterminacy. Assessments of compliance with the Court’s decisions thus may 
underestimate the Court’s ability to generate social change because many Americans who attempt 
to comply with the Court’s decisions may not be counted as “compliant” if their understanding of 
what compliance requires differs from the understanding of the academic measuring it. On the 
other hand, individuals may sincerely believe themselves to be acting in compliance with the 
Court’s orders based on an interpretation of the Court’s opinion distorted by a lack of 
information, insufficient legal expertise, or ideological opposition to the substance of the 
decision. More broadly, these considerations suggest the difficulty of attempting to quantify 
compliance with many decisions. With these limitations in mind, hereinafter we refer to 
“compliance” as the degree to which societal change, rather than stagnation or opposition, 
manifests in response to the Court’s rulings. Ultimately, we mean to imply that, in the absence of 
the Court’s intervention, no such change would have occurred. 
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II.  THE SCHOOL PRAYER CASES AND THE PUBLIC’S RESPONSE 
A. The School Prayer Cases 
In the mid-twentieth century, the Supreme Court began to lay the 
foundation for a robust anti-establishment jurisprudence limiting the role of 
religion in America’s public schools. Beginning with Engel v. Vitale50 and 
Abington School District v. Schempp51 in the early 1960s, the Court 
increasingly recognized and enforced constitutional limits on the degree to 
which public schools could facilitate religious activities such as prayer and 
Bible study. These cases are among the most controversial decisions the Court 
has ever handed down, provoking an immediate and popular backlash that 
endures today. 
Engel v. Vitale was the first major decision of the United States Supreme 
Court recognizing limitations on devotional activity in public schools.52 In 
Engel, ten plaintiff parents filed suit against the New York State Board of 
Regents challenging the Board’s instruction to school principals to begin each 
school day with the recitation of a short non-denominational prayer—
“Almighty God, we acknowledge our dependence upon Thee, and beg Thy 
blessings upon us, our teachers, and our Country.”53 The prayer itself had been 
adopted during the Red Scare heyday of the early 1950s by a “specially 
chosen, interfaith committee” acting with the express goal of composing a 
“non-sectarian” (and thus, as the Regents announced in adopting the policy, 
“clearly constitutional”) devotional recitation.54 The Court invalidated the 
practice, finding “that by using its public school system to encourage recitation 
of the Regents’ prayer, the State of New York has adopted a practice wholly 
inconsistent with the Establishment Clause”55 of the First Amendment as 
incorporated against the states by the Fourteenth Amendment in Cantwell v. 
Connecticut.56 Although many Americans perceived the Court’s opinion as 
 
 50. See Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 424 (1962). 
 51. See Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 205 (1963). 
 52. Although Engel was the first decision of the U.S. Supreme Court in this area, the issue of 
religious observance in public classrooms had a long history of litigation in state courts. 
Beginning in the nineteenth century in response to perceived Catholic incursion into public 
classrooms, a number of states adopted so-called “Blaine Amendments,” named after an 
amendment to the U.S. Constitution proposed by Representative James G. Blaine, forbidding the 
use of public funds for parochial education. See Steven K. Green, The Blaine Amendment 
Reconsidered, 36 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 38, 38 (1992); John C. Jeffries, Jr. & James E. Ryan, A 
Political History of the Establishment Clause, 100 MICH. L. REV. 279, 318 (2001). 
 53. Engel, 370 U.S. at 421–22. 
 54. SARAH BARRINGER GORDON, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAW: RELIGIOUS VOICES AND THE 
CONSTITUTION IN MODERN AMERICA 84–86 (2010); LUCAS A. POWE, JR., THE WARREN COURT 
AND AMERICAN POLITICS 186 (2000). 
 55. Engel, 370 U.S. at 424. 
 56. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940). 
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hostile to religion,57 the Engel Court’s decision expressly recognized the 
pervasiveness of religion in American culture and justified its decision as being 
protective of both church and state, stating that “[t]he Establishment Clause . . . 
stands as an expression of principle on the part of the Founders of our 
Constitution that religion is too personal, too sacred, too holy, to permit its 
‘unhallowed perversion’ by a civil magistrate.”58 
Following Engel, the Court decided Abington School District v. Schempp 
in 1963.59 In that decision, the Court invalidated a Pennsylvania law requiring 
public schools students to read ten Bible verses each day and a local school 
district’s policy of beginning each school day with a recitation of the Lord’s 
Prayer.60 Schempp, unlike Engel, did not seek to present its outcome as driven 
entirely by respect for the “sanctity” of religious belief. Instead, the Court 
concluded that the practices at issue undermined the First Amendment’s 
purpose “to create a complete and permanent separation of the spheres of 
religious activity and civil authority by comprehensively forbidding every form 
of public aid or support for religion.”61 Although the Court again 
acknowledged the importance of religion in America, quoting Engel’s 
observation that the “history of man” is “inseparable from the history of 
religion,” it found that there exists in American culture an equally robust 
tradition of respect for religious diversity and religious liberty that necessitates 
a strong separation of church and state.62 
Schempp marked the end of the Warren Court’s involvement with the issue 
of prayer in public schools. Despite at least one opportunity to do so,63 the 
Supreme Court did not return to the issue for two decades, during which time 
eight of the nine Justices involved in Engel and Schempp left the bench, and 
the Court, along with the national political climate generally, moved in a 
conservative direction.64 When the Court finally returned to the issue of school 
 
 57. See infra Part II. 
 58. Engel, 370 U.S. at 431–32. 
 59. Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963). Although the Schempp decision 
was issued a year after Engel, it had first come before the Court in 1960, when the Justices 
remanded the case “on a procedural point that they knew as well as anyone would make no 
difference in the case.” Corinna Lain, God, Civil Virtue, and the American Way: Reconstructing 
Engel, 67 STAN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2015). Lain speculates that, knowing that Schempp would 
return and anticipating a strong public reaction to a decision striking down the reading of the 
Lord’s Prayer and the Bible in public classrooms, the Court may have granted certiorari in the 
“oddball” case of Engel in order to “ease the nation into Schempp.” Id. 
 60. Schempp, 374 U.S. at 205. 
 61. Id. at 217. 
 62. Id. at 212–13. 
 63. See Stein v. Oshinsky, 382 U.S. 957 (1965) (denying petition for certiorari in litigation 
challenging public school district’s policy prohibiting student-initiated prayer). 
 64. It is neither surprising nor coincidental that the Court’s ideological shift tracked that of 
the broader political culture, as political scientists and legal scholars have long understood that 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2015] THE HALLOWED HOPE: THE SCHOOL PRAYER CASES AND SOCIAL CHANGE 421 
prayer in Wallace v. Jaffree,65 Justice Brennan was the only remaining member 
of the Court that had decided Engel and Schempp. Nonetheless, Jaffree not 
only reaffirmed, but significantly extended the separationist position the Court 
had adopted in its earlier decisions. Jaffree involved an Alabama statute that 
provided for a one-minute moment of silence at the beginning of each school 
day “for meditation or voluntary prayer.”66 Applying the test articulated in 
Lemon v. Kurtzman,67 the Court concluded that Alabama’s moment of silence 
statute violated the Establishment Clause because it “was not motivated by any 
clearly secular purpose—indeed, the statute had no secular purpose,”68 a 
conclusion supported largely by testimony from the statute’s sponsor that “the 
legislation was an ‘effort to return voluntary prayer to our public schools’” and 
that he had “no other purpose in mind” when introducing it.69 Jaffree’s 
principal inquiry thus shifted from a question of the policy’s effect as an 
 
the Article III appointment process as well as various informal mechanisms place pressure on the 
Court to move with the prevailing ideological winds. William Mishler & Reginald S. Sheehan, 
The Supreme Court as a Countermajoritarian Institution? The Impact of Public Opinion on 
Supreme Court Decisions, 87 AM. POLIT. SCI. REV. 87, 95, 97 (1993); Dahl, supra note 23, at 
280. See also David G. Barnum, The Supreme Court and Public Opinion: Judicial Decision 
Making in the Post-New Deal Period, 47 J. POL. 652, 659, 661 (1985). 
 65. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 39–42 (1985). The Court’s 1985 decision concerning 
Alabama’s statutory moment of silence for “meditation or voluntary prayer” is the most 
significant decision of the Jaffree series and the one on which our discussion will focus. It should 
be noted, however, that in granting certiorari for that case, the Court summarily affirmed the 
Eleventh Circuit’s holding that another Alabama statute, which provided that “any teacher or 
professor in any public educational institution within the state of Alabama . . . may pray, [or] may 
lead willing students in prayer,” violated the Establishment Clause. Id. at 40 n.3; see Jaffree v. 
Bd. of Sch. Comm’rs, 459 U.S. 1314, 1315 (1983). Although the Court heard no cases dealing 
with the specific issue of school prayer, the years between Schempp and Jaffree were not entirely 
devoid of cases involving the interaction of religion and public education. In 1968, only five 
years after Schempp, the Court struck down an Arkansas statute prohibiting the teaching of 
human evolution in public schools and universities. Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 109 
(1968); cf. Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 582 (1987) (overruling Louisiana statute 
requiring instruction in “creation science” alongside evolution). In 1980, the Court held that a 
Kentucky statute permitting the posting of the Ten Commandments in public classrooms violated 
the Establishment Clause. Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 41 (1980) (per curiam). In all of these 
cases, the Court applied a strongly separationist interpretation of the Establishment Clause and 
further entrenched the division between religious observance and public education. 
 66. Jaffree, 472 U.S. at 40 n.2 (quoting Ala. Code § 16-1-20.1). 
 67. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612–13 (1971). The Lemon test dictates that “to pass 
muster under the Establishment Clause the law in question, first, must reflect a clearly secular 
legislative purpose, second, must have a primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion, 
and, third, must avoid excessive government entanglement with religion.” Comm. for Public Ed. 
& Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 773 (1973) (citing Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612–13) 
(citations omitted). 
 68. Jaffree, 472 U.S. at 56. 
 69. Id. at 56–57. 
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endorsement of religion, which had characterized the Engel and Schempp 
decisions, to one of the legislature’s purpose or reason for enacting it. The 
Jaffree majority distinguished the legislative desire to protect a student’s right 
to pray voluntarily from the desire “to convey a message of state endorsement 
and promotion of prayer,” and thus implied that only the latter motivation is 
constitutionally suspect.70 Therefore, although the Court’s decision to 
invalidate Alabama’s moment of silence statute adhered to the separationist 
policy adopted in the Warren Court’s earlier decisions, the decision has been 
rather limited in practice. As of 2008, thirty-five states had statutes permitting 
or requiring moments of silence in public classrooms,71 and those statutes have 
generally passed judicial muster under the Lemon test notwithstanding the 
Court’s ruling in Jaffree.72 
More recent decisions have seen the Court’s attention shift from religious 
activities in public classrooms to those that occur during extracurricular 
activities. The Court’s decisions in these cases have maintained the 
separationist position of its earlier decisions, further limiting the sphere of 
constitutionally permissible religious observance in activities related to public 
education. At the same time, these decisions have reiterated the Court’s 
recognition of religion’s respected status in American culture. The first of 
these cases, Lee v. Weisman, presented an Establishment Clause challenge to a 
policy of the Providence, Rhode Island School Committee and the 
Superintendent of Schools to permit principals to invite members of the clergy 
to give invocations and benedictions at middle school and high school 
graduation exercises.73 In a 5–4 decision, the Court overruled the policy, 
concluding that “[t]he government involvement with religious activity in this 
case is pervasive, to the point of creating a state-sponsored and state-directed 
religious exercise in a public school.”74 As in Engel and Schempp, the Court 
emphasized the need to protect religious liberty from state interference and 
found the school principal’s request for a “nonsectarian” prayer to be an 
 
 70. Id. at 59; see also id. at 62 (Powell, J., concurring) (asserting that “some moment-of-
silence statutes may be constitutional”); id. at 67–69 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 71. States with Moment of Silence or School Prayer Legislation, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF 
STATE LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org/research/education/moment-of-silence-and-school-
prayer.aspx (last updated 2008). 
 72. See, e.g., Sherman ex rel. Sherman v. Koch, 623 F.3d 501, 508–09 (7th Cir. 2010) 
(upholding Illinois statute providing for a “a brief period of silence” that “shall be an opportunity 
for silent prayer or for silent reflection,” distinguishing Jaffree on the basis that the Illinois statute 
had a secular purpose); Croft v. Perry, 562 F.3d 735, 750–51 (5th Cir. 2009) (upholding Texas 
moment of silence statute); Brown v. Gilmore, 258 F.3d 265, 281–82 (4th Cir. 2001) (upholding 
Virginia moment of silence statute); Bown v. Gwinnett Cnty. School Dist., 112 F.3d 1464, 1474 
(11th Cir. 1997) (upholding Georgia moment of silence statute); May v. Cooperman, 780 F.2d 
240, 252–53 (3rd Cir. 1985) (upholding New Jersey moment of silence statute). 
 73. Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 581 (1992). 
 74. Id. at 579, 587. 
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unconstitutional incursion of the state into matters of religious expression.75 “It 
must not be forgotten, then,” the majority wrote, “that while concern must be 
given to define the protection granted to an objector or a dissenting 
nonbeliever, [the Free Exercise and Establishment] Clauses exist to protect 
religion from government interference.”76 The practice of school-sponsored 
religious observance at graduation ceremonies, then, was constitutionally 
impermissible both because of its effect on the objecting student, who “had no 
real alternative which would have allowed her to avoid the fact or appearance 
of participation,”77 and also for its effect on creating a state-sponsored 
religious orthodoxy.78 
Eight years after Weisman, the Court issued its most recent decision 
concerning the constitutional contours of school-sponsored prayer at public 
school extracurricular activities, Santa Fe Independent School District v. 
Doe.79 Doe took the separationist principle even further, applying it not only to 
the capstone extracurricular event of graduation, but to student-led, student-
initiated prayer at high school football games. In Doe, the petitioner District 
adopted a policy permitting the student body to hold a referendum each spring 
on whether an “invocation” or “message” would be delivered as part of the 
pre-game ceremonies and, if so, to elect a student to deliver it.80 Applying the 
principles set forth in Weisman, the Court held that although the prayer was 
approved by the student body and delivered by an elected student 
representative, the delivery of prayer at extracurricular football games violated 
the Establishment Clause.81 The Court determined, first, that the majoritarian 
 
 75. Id. at 594. 
 76. Id. at 589–90. 
 77. Id. at 588. 
 78. Lee, 505 U.S. at 589–90. 
 79. Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 290, 294 (2000). Classifying Doe as the 
most recent of the “school prayer” decisions requires some perhaps arbitrary line-drawing, as 
does distinguishing “school prayer” cases from other cases exploring the intersection of religion 
and public education. As noted above, for example, the Court heard an Establishment Clause 
challenge to a state statute requiring posting the Ten Commandments in public classrooms in 
1980, during the period between Schempp and Jaffree. See Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 
U.S. 203, 205 (1963). The Court has also addressed closely related issues in the years since Doe; 
in 2001, for example, the Court held in Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 120 
(2001), that a public school’s exclusion of an after-school student club based on its religious 
nature constituted viewpoint discrimination in violation of the Free Speech Clause, and that such 
discrimination was not justified by the Establishment Clause. 
 80. Doe, 530 U.S. at 298 n.6. The school actually adopted two versions of the policy, the 
second of which specified that any pre-game prayer must be “nonsectarian” and 
“nonproselytizing.” Id. at 296–97. The alternative policy would go into effect only if a court order 
enjoined the District from enforcing the primary policy; such an injunction was in fact entered, 
but the distinction between the two policies was immaterial to the Supreme Court’s analysis. 
 81. Id. at 316 n.23. 
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process of the student referendum and election did not establish the pre-game 
ceremony as a limited public forum, and second, that “the realities of the 
situation plainly reveal that its policy involves both perceived and actual 
endorsement of religion.”82 Concluding that “that the delivery of a pregame 
prayer has the improper effect of coercing those present to participant in an act 
of religious worship,” the Court invalidated the District’s policy as a violation 
of the Establishment Clause.83 
B. Immediate Responses to the School Prayer Cases 
Although the Court attempted in many of its school prayer decisions to 
explain the importance of separation as a mechanism for ensuring religious 
liberty and freedom of conscience, the public has nonetheless seen these cases 
as an encroachment of secularism against the free exercise of religion. Engel 
and Schempp “fell like a meteor into American society” and were perceived by 
much of the American public as an attack on the nation’s religious heritage and 
liberty.84 Americans responded by criticizing and rejecting the Court’s 
separationist reading of the Establishment Clause.85 The Engel decision alone 
generated more hate mail than any previous decision in the institution’s 
history, beating out its enormously controversial decision in Brown v. Board of 
Education ordering the desegregation of public schools eight years earlier.86 In 
the immediate aftermath of Engel, each living former President of the United 
States quickly condemned the decision; President Kennedy’s response, though 
moderate in comparison, carefully avoided explicitly endorsing the Court’s 
ruling.87 Cardinal Francis Spellman of New York was “shocked and 
 
 82. Id. at 304–05. 
 83. Id. at 312. 
 84. GORDON, supra note 54, at 86. Steven Engel, the prevailing petitioner in Engel v. Vitale, 
put the matter more bluntly: “We won the case [and] all hell broke loose.” BRUCE J. 
DIERENFIELD, THE BATTLE OVER SCHOOL PRAYER: HOW ENGEL V. VITALE CHANGED AMERICA 
138 (2007). 
 85. Although opposition to the school prayer decisions was widespread, it was not entirely 
unanimous. Jewish and mainline Protestant organizations largely approved of Engel and 
Schempp, as did the editorial pages of the New York Times and the Washington Post. See 
DIERENFIELD, supra note 84, at 135; Jeffries & Ryan, supra note 52, at 320–21. 
 86. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954); POWE, supra note 54, at 187. 
 87. In his biography of Earl Warren, Jim Newton argues that while former presidents 
Truman, Eisenhower, and Hoover quickly “denounced” the Court’s decision in Engel, President 
Kennedy “unequivocally stood behind it.” JIM NEWTON, JUSTICE FOR ALL: EARL WARREN AND 
THE NATION HE MADE 394–95 (2006). This seems true only for a quite narrow definition of 
“unequivocal.” Kennedy’s response—which comprised a single answer to a question at the end of 
an otherwise unrelated press conference—was more an exhortation to moderation than an 
endorsement of the Court’s decision. Kennedy noted the importance of “support[ing] the 
Supreme Court[‘s] decisions even when we may not agree with them,” and suggested “a very 
easy remedy and that is to pray ourselves.” THEODORE C. SORENSEN, KENNEDY 364 (1965). He 
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frightened” by the two landmark decisions, and evangelist Billy Graham was 
“shocked and disappointed”88 by the Court’s “step toward the secularization of 
the United States.”89 Moreover, many American Protestants were genuinely 
confused by a decision that seemed to disregard the distinction between 
sectarian and ecumenical instruction that they believed to be entrenched in 
state and federal constitutional doctrine.90 One study, for example, quotes an 
unidentified Protestant minister who objected to the Engel decision on the 
ground that “I realize that denominationalism cannot be taught in schools but 
to say that we cannot refer to God or the Bible is outrageous.”91 Even some 
Catholics, who traditionally had been the targets of Protestant anti-sectarian 
lawsuits, defended the non-sectarian model in the aftermath of Engel and 
Schempp, such as when Bishop John J. Russell of Richmond said at the 1963 
Red Mass in Washington, D.C., “Thank God, our Constitution forbids the 
State’s setting up or favoring any particular form of religion . . . . But that 
separation of church and state which we all cherish in our country never meant 
the divorce of government from religion or the separation of law from 
morality.”92 This opposition to Engel was not merely rhetorical; another study 
notes, “schools opened in the fall of 1962 with reports of prayer and Bible-
reading in most parts of the country.”93 
Congress’s institutional response mirrored the public’s indignation. 
Representative George Andrews (D-AL) complained that the Court had “put 
the Negroes in the schools and now they’ve driven God out,”94 and 
Representative Thomas Abernethy (D-MS) complained that the decision would 
 
urged parents to take the decision as an opportunity to renew their religious commitments at 
home and in church while continuing to “support the Constitution and the responsibility of the 
Supreme Court in interpreting it, which is theirs, and given to them by the Constitution.” 
President John F. Kennedy, News Conference Number 37 at the State Department Auditorium 
(June 27, 1962), available at http://csis.org/files/media/csis/programs/taiwan/timeline/sums/time 
line_docs/CSI_19620627.htm. Kennedy thus “stood behind” the decision only in the sense of 
urging respect for the judicial process without expressing any personal endorsement of the 
decision itself. Id. 
 88. PETER IRONS, A PEOPLE’S HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT: THE MEN AND WOMEN 
WHOSE CASES AND DECISIONS HAVE SHAPED OUR CONSTITUTION (rev. ed. 2006). 
 89. Peter Irons, Curing a Monumental Error: The Presumptive Unconstitutionality of Ten 
Commandments Displays, 63 OKLA. L. REV. 1, 6 (2010). 
 90. See Jeffries & Ryan, supra note 52, at 282–83. 
 91. Bruce J. Dierenfield, Secular Schools? Religious Practices in New York and Virginia 
Public Schools Since World War II, 4 J. POL’Y HIST. 361, 369 (1992). 
 92. SETH STERN & STEPHEN WERMIEL, JUSTICE BRENNAN: LIBERAL CHAMPION 174–75 
(2010). 
 93. FRANK J. SORAUF, THE WALL OF SEPARATION: THE CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS OF 
CHURCH AND STATE 296 (1976). 
 94. IRONS, supra note 88, at 6. 
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be “most pleasing to a few atheists and world Communism.”95 Perhaps most 
portentous was the response of Representative Frank J. Becker (R-NY), the 
eventual leader of the movement to reverse the Court’s decision by 
constitutional amendment, who viewed Engel as “the most tragic decision in 
the history of the United States.”96 Congressman James Haley (D-FL) 
immediately “offered an amendment to a judiciary appropriations bill to 
earmark out of the Supreme Court’s appropriations funds to purchase ‘for the 
personal use of each justice a copy of the Holy Bible’ . . . . And on September 
27, the House voted unanimously to place the motto ‘In God We Trust’ behind 
the Speaker’s desk.”97 Upon hearing that the school board in Netcong, New 
Jersey, had adopted a practice of beginning each school day by reading and 
reflecting upon the portion of the Congressional Record in which the 
chaplain’s prayer is entered, Representative Richard Roudebush (R-IN) began 
reading children’s prayers into each week’s Record stating, “I hope this plan 
catches on like wildfire, . . . and that schools across the Nation will turn to the 
pages of the Congressional Record for a source of children’s prayers inserted 
to provide a legal remedy to the tragic Supreme Court decision.”98 
Engel and Schempp marked the beginning of a decades-long campaign to 
amend the Constitution to return religious worship to public education. Even 
before Schempp was decided, “some fifty-odd proposals to amend the 
Constitution in order to overcome the result of the Engel decision were 
introduced in the House of Representatives and in the Senate of the United 
States.”99 As the 1964 elections loomed nearer, the number of amendments 
proposed by members of Congress to undo the Court’s religion rulings swelled 
to at least 146.100 The most noteworthy of the early attempts to reverse the 
Court through a constitutional amendment was the “Becker Amendment,” 
introduced by Congressman Becker on September 10, 1963. Among other 
things, the Becker Amendment proposed to allow “the offering, reading from, 
or listening to prayers or Biblical scriptures” on a voluntary basis or “making 
reference to belief in, reliance upon, or invoking the aid of God or a Supreme 
 
 95. William M. Beaney & Edward N. Beiser, Prayer in Politics: The Impact of Engel and 
Schempp on the Political Process, in THE IMPACT OF SUPREME COURT DECISIONS: EMPIRICAL 
STUDIES 22, 24 (Theodore L. Becker & Malcolm M. Feeley eds., 2d ed. 1973). 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. 
 98. JOAN DELFATTORE, THE FOURTH R: CONFLICTS OVER RELIGION IN AMERICA’S PUBLIC 
SCHOOLS 97 (2004). 
 99. Paul G. Kauper, Prayer, Public Schools and the Supreme Court, 61 MICH. L. REV. 1031, 
1032 n.4 (1963). 
 100. Beaney & Beiser, supra note 95, at 28; cf. Lain, supra note 59, at 29 (“[B]y the time 
congressional hearings were held in 1964, nearly 150 proposed constitutional amendments had 
been submitted.”) (citing Geoffrey R. Stone, In Opposition to the School Prayer Amendment, 50 
U. CHI. L. REV. 823, 826 (1983)). 
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Being” in public schools.101 Although opponents of the Becker Amendment 
ultimately killed the bill in the House Judiciary Committee, the proposal 
prompted lengthy hearings in Congress and attracted the support of a majority 
of members at the height of its popularity. 
Opponents of the Court’s school prayer decisions were relatively 
undeterred by the Becker Amendment’s failure in Congress. For example, 
Senator Robert C. Byrd (D-WV) proposed the “School Prayer Amendment,” 
which would have protected Americans’ right to engage in voluntary prayer 
“and to recognize their religious beliefs, heritage, or traditions on public 
property, including schools,” seven times between 1962 and 1997.102 Likewise, 
on May 18, 1982, President Ronald Reagan proposed an amendment allowing 
school prayer, declaring in a radio address that “the first amendment is being 
turned on its head” by the Court’s religion decisions.103 In 1994, newly-elected 
Speaker of the House Newt Gingrich proposed yet another amendment 
allowing voluntary school prayer, which President Bill Clinton considered 
endorsing before eventually retreating from that position.104 President 
Clinton’s lukewarm support for a constitutional amendment allowing voluntary 
school prayer was consistent with the position of almost every president since 
Engel, most of who have expressed at least limited support for such a 
proposal.105 
 
 101. Stephen K. Green, Evangelicals and the Becker Amendment: A Lesson in Church-State 
Moderation, 33 J. CHURCH & ST. 541, 557–58 (1991). 
 102. JAN B YOUNG, THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION: A BRIEF HISTORY AND 
COMMENTARY 60 (2010). 
 103. Ronald Reagan, Radio Address to the Nation on Prayer in Schools from Camp David, 
Md. (Feb. 25, 1984), available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=39565. 
 104. Stephen Carter, Let Us Pray, NEW YORKER, Dec. 5, 1994, at 60. 
 105. Nearly every president since Engel and Schempp were decided has taken a public 
position on the issue of religion in schools, many of them expressing at least mild support for a 
constitutional amendment permitting voluntary prayer during the school day. For instance, in a 
campaign debate against then-presidential nominee Jimmy Carter, President Gerald Ford said: “I 
believe also that there is some merit to an amendment that Senator Everett Dirksen proposed very 
frequently, an amendment that would change the Court decision as far as voluntary prayer in 
public schools.” President Gerald R. Ford, Presidential Campaign Debate at the College of 
William & Mary (Oct. 22, 1976), available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=6517. 
President Ronald Reagan, in proposing the amendment discussed above, lamented the Court’s 
“relentless drive to eliminate God from our schools.” President Ronald Reagan, Remarks at a 
Candle-Lighting Ceremony for Prayer in Schools (Sept. 25, 1982), available at http://www.rea 
gan.utexas.edu/archives/speeches/1982/92582b.htm. President George H.W. Bush argued in 
defense of prayer in schools that “I continue to believe, as do the overwhelming majority of 
Americans, in the right to nondenominational voluntary school prayer.” President George H.W. 
Bush, Remarks at the Annual Convention of the National Religious Broadcasters (Jan. 27, 1992), 
available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=20540. President Jimmy Carter, although 
in favor of voluntary, student-initiated prayer, said that “in general . . . the Government ought to 
stay out of the prayer business and let it be between a person and God and not let it be part of a 
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After several decades of failed attempts to override the Court’s decisions 
by amending the Constitution, Congress fell back on statutory measures to 
ensure that the exclusion of religious observance from public education would 
not exceed the specific parameters set by the Court. The No Child Left Behind 
Act of 2001 (NCLB)106 amended the Elementary and Secondary Education Act 
of 1965 (ESEA)107 to require the United States Department of Education to 
issue “guidance” on a biennial basis “on constitutionally protected prayer in 
public elementary schools and secondary schools.”108 The NCLB also requires 
as a condition for receipt of federal funds under the ESEA that local 
educational agencies file annual certifications to the State educational agency 
“that no policy of the local educational agency prevents, or otherwise denies 
participation in, constitutionally protected prayer in public elementary schools 
and secondary schools.”109 State agencies are then required to report to the 
federal Department of Education any local agencies that fail to certify their 
non-interference with constitutionally protected prayer activities, or against 
which any complaints of noncompliance have been made. 
C. Persistent Public Hostility 
As noted in the previous section, Congress’s hostility to those decisions 
prohibiting devotional activities in public schools echoes the public’s strong 
and enduring opposition to Engel and its progeny. Americans consistently 
support a greater role for religion in public life, and public schools specifically, 
than they have understood the Court’s decisions to allow. All available 
evidence concerning the public’s attitudes toward religious observance in 
public classrooms indicates that the public generally disapproves of the Court’s 
decisions and prefers a policy of greater inclusion of religious expression than 
 
school program under any tangible constraints, either a direct order to a child to pray or an 
embarrassing situation where the child would feel constrained to pray.” President Jimmy Carter, 
Interview with the President Remarks and a Question and Answer Session with Editors and News 
Directors (Apr. 6, 1979), available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=32170. George 
W. Bush, speaking as a candidate, echoed Carter’s view, expressing his support for “voluntary, 
student-initiated prayer” while cautioning that “[w]e should not have teacher-led prayers in public 
schools, and school officials should never favor one religion over another, or favor religion over 
no religion (or vice versa).” Calvin Woodward, Bush and Gore on the Issues: 20 Questions and 
Answers, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Oct. 19, 2000), available at http://www.lexisnexis.com.ezp.slu. 
edu/hottopics/lnacademic/?verb=sr&csi=7911 (search “Bush and Gore on the Issues”; follow Oct. 
19, 2000 hyperlink). 
 106. No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, 20 U.S.C. §§ 6301–7941 (2012). 
 107. Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-10, 79 Stat. 27 (1965) 
(amended 2012). 
 108. Guidance on Constitutionally Protected Prayer in Public Elementary and Secondary 
Schools, 68 Fed. Reg. 9645 (Feb. 28, 2003). Although the NCLB’s biennial guidance requirement 
remains in effect, the guidance has not been updated since 2003. 
 109. 20 U.S.C. § 7904(b) (2012). 
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Figure 1:  Public Approval of Prayer and Bible Reading 
Cases (GSS Data) 
Approve Disapprove 
it believes the Court to have adopted. Although it is true that the public’s initial 
outrage at the Court’s early school prayer decisions, particularly Engel, was in 
part the result of a distorted understanding of the Court’s holding, public 
opposition to those decisions has remained basically stable as the Court’s 
jurisprudence has moved further in the direction of separation. 
The best evidence of long-term public disapproval of the school prayer 
decisions is found in the General Social Survey (GSS). Figure 1 depicts forty 
years of GSS data indicating the public’s response to the following question: 
“The United States Supreme Court has ruled that no state or local government 
may require the reading of the Lord’s Prayer or Bible verses in public schools. 
What are your views on this—do you approve or disapprove of the court 
ruling?”110 The GSS data indicate consistent public disapproval of Schempp, 



















The GSS results summarized in Figure 1 are the most comprehensive data 
available, but they pertain directly only to the Schempp decision (although we 
would argue that they are strongly suggestive of public disapproval of Engel, 
 
 110. See NAT’L OPINION RESEARCH CTR., GENERAL SOCIAL SURVEYS, 1972–2012: 
CUMULATIVE CODEBOOK viii, 301 (Mar. 2013). “No opinion” and “no answer” responses are 
omitted from the graph; black oversamples for 1982 and 1987 are included in the results for those 
years. 
 111. Although the earliest data point reflects the highest disapproval rate, it should be noted 
that the data do not reflect a general downward trend in disapproval over time. The second-
highest disapproval rate was 61.6% in 2004, and the majority of data points are between 56% and 
58%, including the most recent, 2012, at 57.1%. Id. at 301. 
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as well). Other sources of information concerning the public’s approval of the 
school prayer decisions also indicate broad public disapproval of those 
decisions. A Gallup News Service report issued in 2005, for example, shows 
generally consistent public support for an amendment to permit voluntary 
prayer in public schools between 1983 and 2005.112 Although the degree of 
support for such an amendment as reported by Gallup has wavered between a 
high of 81% in 1983 and a low of 73% in 1994,113 Gallup’s data indicate a high 
and relatively stable degree of public antipathy toward the firm wall of 
separation the Court erected between religious observance and public 
education. 
Although the Gallup report covers only the more recent period of the post-
Engel/Schempp era, strong public opposition to the cases emerged immediately 
after they were decided. David G. Barnum’s work on the Supreme Court’s 
responsiveness to public opinion summarized American National Election 
Studies (ANES) data on school prayer from 1960 through 1980.114 Consistent 
with the later Gallup data, Barnum’s summary indicates that a majority of 
greater than 70% agreed with the proposition that “[s]chools should be allowed 
to start each day with a prayer” during the entirety of that period.115 Moreover, 
during the shorter period of time during the mid-1970s in which the question 
was asked, a majority consistently greater than 60% of the public expressly 
disapproved of the Court’s decisions in Engel and Schempp.116 
The Gallup and ANES data are consistent with every other source of 
public opinion on this issue of which we are aware. Table 1 below summarizes 
a number of relevant polls from the last two decades, all of which indicate the 
public’s dissatisfaction with the Court’s current doctrine and its desire for a 
greater presence of religion in the public classroom. Many of these polls seek 
public opinion not only on the questions of prayer and Bible study in the 
classroom that the Court addressed in Engel and Schempp, but also more 
contemporary issues such as the constitutionality of moments of silence and 
prayer at extracurricular events with which the Court has engaged in its more 
recent decisions. In all but one instance,117 regardless of the question asked, a 
 
 112. See David W. Moore, Public Favors Voluntary Prayer for Public Schools: But Strongly 
Supports Moment of Silence Rather than Spoken Prayer, GALLUP (Aug. 26, 2005), 
http://www.gallup.com/poll/18136/public-favors-voluntary-prayer-public-schools.aspx. 
 113. Id. 
 114. See Barnum, supra note 64, at 655–56. 
 115. Id. at 658. 
 116. Id. 
 117. The single exception is the 2006 CBS News poll, which reported an even split of 46%–
46% in response to the question whether “teaching the Bible in a public school does or does not 
violate the Constitution and the separation of church and state.” Religion (2), 
POLLINGREPORT.COM, http://www.pollingreport.com/religion2.htm (last visited Dec. 20, 2014). 
This apparent anomaly might be explained by the poll’s explicit focus on the legal rather than the 
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majority or large plurality of poll respondents has expressed a desire for 
greater religious observance in public education. 
Table 1: Public Opinion Polls Concerning Prayer in Public Schools 
Polling Entity Time Period Description 
Deseret News/ KSL-TV118 Unspecified; early 1991 80% of poll respondents 
(Utahns) believe that 
prayer “definitely” or 
“probably” should be 
permitted at high school 
graduation ceremonies. 
NBC News/Wall Street 
Journal, conducted by the 
polling organizations of 
Peter Hart and Robert 
Teeter119 
June 16–19, 1999 65% of respondents 
answered “should allow 
prayer” to the following 
prompt: “Let me read you 
two positions on school 
prayer. Between these 
positions, which do you 
tend to side with more? 
Position A: Government 
should allow prayer in 
public schools. Position B: 
Government should 
preserve a clear separation 
between church and state.” 
ABCNews.com120 March 22–26, 2000 67% of respondents 
answered “should be 
permitted” to the question 
“at public school activities 
such as sporting events, do 
you think students should 
or should not be permitted 
to use the public address 
 
normative aspect of the issue. That is, some segment of the public may be willing to accept the 
Court’s authority as the final arbiter of constitutional meaning even when it disagrees with the 
Court’s decision on normative grounds. See infra Part V (discussing the concept of legal 
“legitimacy” as an autonomously normative force). 
 118. Bob Bernick, Jr., 80% Favor Permitting Graduation Prayers, DESERET NEWS (May 26, 
1991, 12:00 AM), http://www.deseretnews.com/article/164241/80-FAVOR-PERMITTING-
GRADUATION-PRAYERS.html?pg=all. 
 119. Religion (3), POLLINGREPORT.COM, http://www.pollingreport.com/religion3.htm (last 
visited Dec. 20, 2014). 
 120. Id. 
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system to lead the audience 
in religious prayers?” 
Newsweek, conducted by 
Princeton Survey Research 
Associates121 
June 29–30, 2000 68% of respondents 
“disagree” and 29% 
“agree” with “the recent 
decision that public school 
districts cannot promote 
prayer before high school 
football games, saying it 
violates the separation 
between church and state.” 
CNN/USA 
Today/Gallup122 
September 19–21, 2003 78% of respondents 
“approve” of “a non-
denominational prayer as 
part of the official program 
at a public school 
ceremony such as a 
graduation or a sporting 
event.” 
Pew Research Center123 July 2005 67% of respondents replied 
“too far” and 28% replied 
“not too far” in response to 
the question “do you think 
that liberals have gone too 
far in trying to keep 
religion out of the schools 
and the government, or 
don't you think liberals 
have gone too far?”  
Gallup124 August 8–11, 2005 60% of respondents 
answered “too little” in 
response to the following 
question: “Thinking about 
the presence that religion 
currently has in public 
schools in this country, do 
 
 121. Judiciary (3), POLLINGREPORT.COM, http://www.pollingreport.com/court3.htm (last 
visited Dec. 20, 2014). 
 122. Religion (3), supra note 119. 
 123. Religion, POLLINGREPORT.COM, http://www.pollingreport.com/religion.htm (last visited 
Dec. 20, 2014). 
 124. Religion (2), supra note 117. 
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you think religion has too 
much of a presence in 
public schools, about the 
right amount, or too little 




November 29–30, 2005 87% of respondents favor 
“allowing public schools to 
set aside time for a moment 
of silence.” 
82% of respondents favor 
“allowing voluntary prayer 
in public schools.” 
82% of respondents favor 
“allowing public schools to 
have a prayer during 
graduation ceremonies.” 
CBS News126 April 6–9, 2006 Respondents evenly split 
(46%–46%) in response to 
the question “in general, do 
you think that teaching the 
Bible in a public school 
does or does not violate the 
Constitution and the 
separation of church and 
state?” 
64% of respondents believe 
that schools should “be 
allowed to teach the Bible 
as a piece of literature, in 
classes like English or 
Social Studies.” 
Plurality of 49% responded 
“more” to the question 
“would you like to see 
religious and spiritual 
values have more influence 
in the schools than they do 
now, less influence, or 
 
 125. Id. 
 126. Id. 
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about the same influence as 
they do now?” (32% 
responded “same,” only 
16% responded “less”). 
Pew Research Center127 August 2006 69% of respondents replied 
“too far” and 26% replied 
“not too far” in response to 
the question “[d]o you 
think that liberals have 
gone too far in trying to 
keep religion out of the 
schools and the 
government, or don't you 




Sept. 14–16, 2010 84% of respondents 
answered “right to pray 
anywhere” to the question 
“do you think the federal 
courts are correct in ruling 
that the Constitution allows 
government to stop prayer 
in schools and on public 
property, or do you think 
when the Constitution says 
no branch of the 
government shall interfere 
with the free exercise of 
religion that it gives 
Americans the right to pray 
anywhere they want?”129 
Rasmussen130 Unclear; early 2011 65% of respondents 
answered “favor” in 
response to the question 
 
 127. Religion, supra note 123. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. We hesitate to acknowledge this poll given the clearly distorted picture of 
Establishment Clause doctrine it presents and the suggestive manner in which the question is 
phrased, but include it for whatever value it may possess. 
 130. 65% of Americans Favor Prayer in Public Schools, RASMUSSEN REPORTS (Feb. 11, 
2011), http://www.rasmussenreports.com/public_content/lifestyle/general_lifestyle/february_ 
2011/65_of_americans_favor_prayer_in_public_schools. 
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“[d]o you favor or oppose 
prayer in public schools?” 
Harris131 September 12–19, 2011 69% of respondents 
“strongly support” or 
“somewhat support” 
“prayer in school.” 
Pew Research Center132 June 28–July 9, 2012 65% of respondents replied 
“too far” and 30% replied 
“not too far” in response to 
the question “[d]o you 
think that liberals have 
gone too far in trying to 
keep religion out of the 
schools and the 
government, or don't you 
think liberals have gone too 
far?” 
Public Religion Research 
Institute133 
January 16–20, 2013 76% of respondents 
“completely agree” 
 or “mostly agree” with the 
statement “[p]ublic high 
schools should be allowed 
to sponsor prayer before 
football games”; 21% 
“completely disagree” or 
“mostly disagree.” 
 
All of this evidence appears to point to one conclusion: the public largely 
opposes the Supreme Court’s decisions in Engel, Schempp, and their progeny, 
and its opposition remained relatively stable over the last five decades.134 But 
 
 131. Public Opinion on 15 Controversial and Divisive Issues, HARRIS POLLS (Oct. 4, 2011), 
http://www.harrisinteractive.com/NewsRoom/HarrisPolls/tabid/447/ctl/ReadCustom%20Default/
mid/1508/ArticleId/874/Default.aspx. 
 132. Religion, supra note 123. 
 133. Id. 
 134. On the other hand, recent evidence indicates that intensity of public preference regarding 
school religion may have diminished since the immediate backlash against Engel and Schempp. 
In the September 2011 Harris poll cited in Table 1, only 6% of respondents identified “[p]rayer in 
school” as one of “the two issues that are most important to you when voting for a candidate.” 
“Prayer in school” thus ranks an unimpressive twelfth on the list of Americans’ most pressing 
concerns. See Public Opinion, supra note 131. On the other hand, it is the only issue from the 
heyday of the Warren Court to appear on the Harris list at all. In fact, the only social issue directly 
traceable to a specific Supreme Court decision that ranks higher on the Harris list than “[p]rayer 
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is this opposition to what the Court actually held, or is it largely result of the 
public’s ignorance about and misunderstanding of the scope of the Court’s 
decisions? In a recent history of Engel, Corinna Lain presents a compelling 
argument that the initial public outcry against that decision was driven largely 
by popular misunderstanding of the Court’s holding that was caused by media 
distortions and the tone-deaf manner in which the Court presented its 
decision.135 Professor Lain notes that the public reaction to Engel was shaped 
largely by the initial media reports that, in their haste, frequently 
misinterpreted the decisions’ scope or omitted important details.136 For 
instance, media reports about Engel “went out within five minutes of the 
decision’s announcement, feeding what would become the lead story in all 
news outlets by the end of the day and front-page news the following 
morning.”137 Those initial reports “gave the impression that the Court had 
forbidden prayer of any type—individual or state-sponsored—in public 
schools.”138 “COURT OUTLAWS GOD,” the newspapers declared, and the public 
took the media at their word.139 Lost in this flurry of breathless reporting and 
reflexive outrage was Engel’s nuance—the fact that the decision applied only 
to state-drafted prayer of which New York’s was sui generis, the majority’s 
clarification that its reasoning did not extend to all types of religious 
observance in public schools or to ceremonial deism more generally, and so 
on. Had the initial media reaction more accurately portrayed the context and 
content of the decision, there is some reason to believe that the public’s 
reaction may have been less hostile than it was. Indeed, Professor Lain notes 
the irony that the considered views of legislative and religious leaders who 
started out as sharp critics of Engel moved closer to the Court’s position as 
they strove to draft a constitutional amendment protecting the right to school-
led prayer in a religiously pluralistic society.140 Even the final version of the 
Becker Amendment, which the Republican Party adopted as part of its 
platform in 1964, looked remarkably similar to the policy that the Court 
adopted in Engel.141 
 
in school” is “[a]bortion rights,” an area in which the public debate continues to be influenced by 
the Burger Court’s decision in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), and its progeny. 
 135. Lain, supra note 59, at 31–33. 
 136. Id. at 26–31. 
 137. Id. at 34. 
 138. Id. 
 139. Id. at 27 (citing EARL WARREN, THE MEMOIRS OF CHIEF JUSTICE EARL WARREN 315–
16 (1977)). 
 140. Lain, supra note 59, at 40 (citing JOHN H. LAUBACH, SCHOOL PRAYERS: CONGRESS, 
THE COURTS, AND THE PUBLIC 95 (1969)). 
 141. The 1964 Republican platform called for: 
A Constitutional amendment permitting those individuals and groups who choose to do so 
to exercise their religion freely in public places, provided religious exercises are not 
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Professor Lain also points to the Court’s own presentation of its decision in 
Engel as contributing to the public’s misunderstanding of the decision. The 
Court viewed the case as such a clear violation of the Establishment Clause 
that it failed to anticipate the public outcry against its decision, or to clearly 
emphasize the limits of its holding.142 As the Court explained a year later in 
Schempp, the Engel decision rested on “principles . . . so universally 
recognized” that Justice Black’s majority opinion resolved the issue “without 
the citation of a single case.”143 Chief Justice Warren noted in conference that 
the respondent had “practically conceded” the Establishment Clause violation, 
and even the conservative Justice Harlan agreed that reversal was 
“inescapable.”144 “To the justices in the majority, Engel was self-evident, a 
matter of constitutional common sense,” and the tone and brevity of the 
majority’s decision reflected the Justices’ sense that the result was obvious.145 
The Court’s own perception of Engel as an unambiguous case of religious 
establishment apparently left the Justices blind to the potential for media 
distortion and public outrage against a decision that, however lightly, cut 
against the previous decade’s rampant religiosity and, by extension, anti-
Communism.146 
The majority’s failure to perceive the potential for controversy surrounding 
Engel was compounded by the concurring and dissenting opinions, which 
Professor Lain credits with playing a significant role in shaping the public’s 
perception of the Court’s decision. Both Justice Douglas, writing in 
concurrence, and Justice Stewart, the lone dissenter, failed to see any limiting 
principle in the majority’s reasoning that could constitutionally distinguish the 
Regent’s Prayer at issue in that case from the myriad forms of “ceremonial 
deism,” such as the reference to God on currency and the phrase “under God” 
 
prepared or prescribed by the state or political subdivision thereof and no person’s 
participation therein is coerced, thus preserving the traditional separation of church and 
state. 
Id. at 40 (citing LAUBACH, supra note 140, at 93). 
 142. Id. at 19 (“For [a decision] engendering so much controversy, Engel was remarkably 
uncontroversial among the Justices who decided it.”). 
 143. Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 220–21 (1963). This is not strictly 
accurate, as Justice Black’s opinion does cite the Court’s earlier decision in Everson v. Board of 
Education, 330 U.S. 1 (1947), albeit only as a matter of historical background. See Engel v. 
Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 428 n.11 (1962). 
 144. Lain, supra note 59, at 19. 
 145. Id. at 21. 
 146. Id. at 17–18 (discussing rise and wane of religiosity as anti-Communist signifier in the 
1950s); see also GORDON, supra note 54, at 49. The Regent’s Prayer at issue in the Engel 
decision was adopted in 1951 by the New York State Board of Regents as an anti-Communist 
measure. See POWE, supra note 54, at 186. 
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in the Pledge of Allegiance,147 that proliferate American public culture.148 
Agreeing that the Regent’s Prayer was indistinguishable from other forms of 
state-sponsored religious references, Douglas and Stewart disagreed only as to 
the constitutional implications of that observation: for Stewart, the Regent’s 
Prayer fit comfortably within the sphere of constitutionally permissible 
ceremonial references to the divine, whereas for Douglas, the Establishment 
Clause prohibited all state-sponsored invocations of God.149 The disagreement 
between Douglas and Stewart, Professor Lain argues, seemed to call into 
question the constitutional validity not only of the idiosyncratic prayer that 
New York imposed on its public schools, but the much broader corpus of 
public religiosity.150 The majority, to which the distinctions seemed apparent, 
responded to this interpretation only in a brief footnote, which was largely 
ignored by media commentary on the case.151 Thus, the majority’s sparse 
articulation of its own reasoning and its failure to respond more robustly to 
Justices Douglas and Stewart contributed directly to the media’s distortions of 
the decision, which in turn fed the public’s perception that Engel struck at the 
heart of America’s religious culture.152 
We find Professor Lain’s historical analysis convincing, but also entirely 
compatible with the point that the school prayer cases have been the object of 
intense and sustained public opposition since Engel was decided. From the 
perspective of Rosenberg’s and Hall’s theories of judicial power, the question 
of why a line of precedent is broadly unpopular is less significant than the 
simple fact that it is unpopular. It is indeed ironic that the considered position 
of many political and religious elites who initially opposed Engel came to 
resemble the Court’s holding as they were forced to grapple with the issue of 
 
 147. The phrase “under God” was legislatively added to the Pledge of Allegiance in 1954. See 
4 U.S.C. § 4 (2012). In 2004, the Supreme Court heard an Establishment Clause challenge to that 
language, but dismissed the case for lack of standing without addressing the First Amendment 
issue. Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 17–18 (2004). 
 148. See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 716 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing Arthur 
Sutherland, Book Review, 40 IND. L.J. 83, 86 (1964)); Engel, 370 U.S. at 449 (Stewart, J., 
dissenting). 
 149. Engel, 370 U.S. at 437 (1962) (Douglas, J., concurring) (“The point for decision is 
whether the Government can constitutionally finance a religious exercise. Our system at the 
federal and state levels is presently honeycombed with such financing. Nevertheless, I think it is 
an unconstitutional undertaking whatever form it takes.”) (footnote omitted); id. at 450 (Stewart, 
J., dissenting) (arguing that the Regent’s Prayer is compatible with other forms of constitutional 
ceremonial deism). 
 150. Lain, supra note 59, at 31. 
 151. Id. at 31 (quoting Engel, 370 U.S. at 435 n.21). For example, the New York Times 
reprinted the main text of the Engel decisions, but did not print the footnotes. Its readership was 
therefore left unaware of the majority’s response to Douglas’s and Stewart’s broad interpretation 
of the Engel decision. Id. at 32. 
 152. Id. at 31–32, 39. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2015] THE HALLOWED HOPE: THE SCHOOL PRAYER CASES AND SOCIAL CHANGE 439 
state-sponsored devotional practice in a religiously pluralistic society. 
Nevertheless, it remains true that the general public and many elites have 
persisted in disapproving Engel and its progeny even when, in some cases, 
their substantive policy preferences on the issue of religious observance in 
public classrooms are not far from the Court’s position. This disapproval and 
the accompanying public backlash against the school prayer decisions is 
sufficient to activate whatever causal mechanisms may be associated with 
unpopularity in both Rosenberg’s and Hall’s analyses; it is unnecessary that the 
disapproval also be well-informed. Indeed, public ignorance of the Court’s 
decisions has been and is widespread.153 A background assumption of public 
ignorance is therefore a necessary element of any plausible theory of judicial 
power. 
It is also true that the gap between public perception and legal reality 
concerning religious observance in public schools has narrowed since Engel 
was decided. Engel itself may have only applied to the state-composed 
ecumenical prayer that was unique to New York, but the Court quickly 
invalidated recitation of the Lord’s Prayer and Bible reading—two practices 
that enjoyed broader public support—in Abington School District v. 
Schempp.154 Two decades later, in Wallace v. Jaffree, the Court struck down a 
school district policy requiring a moment of silence for voluntary prayer at the 
beginning of each school day,155 and in Lee v. Weisman and Santa Fe 
Independent School District v. Doe, it prohibited voluntary or student-led 
prayer at extracurricular events.156 All of these practices enjoyed—and 
continue to enjoy—broad public support.157 Thus, although some hyperbole 
and distortion persists, the public is not wrong to believe that the Court’s 
decisions have adopted a separationist position that is at odds with the 
preferences of a substantial and stable majority of citizens.158 While the Court 
 
 153. See VALERIE J. HOEKSTRA, PUBLIC REACTION TO SUPREME COURT DECISIONS 6 
(2003); Gregory A. Caldeira, Courts and Public Opinion, in THE AMERICAN COURTS: A 
CRITICAL ASSESSMENT 303, 303 (John B. Gates & Charles A. Johnson eds., 1990); Gregory A. 
Caldeira & Kevin T. McGuire, What Americans Know About the Courts and Why It Matters, in 
THE JUDICIAL BRANCH 262, 265 (Kermit L. Hall & Kevin T. McGuire eds., 2005). 
 154. Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 223 (1963). 
 155. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 60–61 (1985). 
 156. Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 317 (2000); Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 
577, 599 (1992). 
 157. See supra Table 1. 
 158. It may be the case, though it is too early to say so definitively, that the Court’s recent 
decision in Town of Greece v. Galloway, 134 S. Ct. 1811, 1828 (2014), upholding the petitioner 
municipality’s practice of opening town board meetings with prayer against an Establishment 
Clause challenge, may signal a greater openness on the part of the Court to state-sponsored prayer 
in public schools. See, e.g., Christopher Lund, Symposium: Town of Greece v. Galloway Going 
Forward, SCOTUSBLOG (May 6, 2014, 5:05 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2014/05/symposi 
um-town-of-greece-v-galloway-going-forward/ (noting that “[t]he Court is clear about its desire 
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has by no means “outlaw[ed] God,”159 it has for over fifty years adhered to an 
interpretation of the Establishment Clause that requires increasingly strict 
separation between public education and religious observance despite 
persistent public opposition. Moreover, it has done so without substantial 
assistance from the other branches of the federal government in enforcing its 
interpretation of the Establishment Clause, and in an area in which it must rely 
on non-judicial actors, including teachers, principals, school superintendents, 
and other education professionals, for direct implementation of its decisions. In 
such circumstances, both Rosenberg and Hall would predict that the Court’s 
edicts on school prayer would face near total noncompliance. The next section 
examines that prediction in light of the available empirical evidence. 
III.  EMPIRICAL ASSESSMENTS OF THE RELIGION CASES’ IMPACT 
The Court’s school prayer decisions, perhaps predictably given the public 
response they generated, have attracted much attention from legal and political 
science scholars from a variety of perspectives. While legal scholars in 
particular have debated the doctrinal validity of the Court’s application of the 
Establishment Clause in these cases at great length,160 our concern here is with 
those cases’ empirically demonstrable effects. Regardless of the merits of the 
Court’s constitutional interpretation, to what extent were these decisions 
successful in altering the behavior of a largely hostile public? A number of 
 
to raise the bar [for Establishment Clause challenges to legislative prayer], but unclear on where 
exactly it means to set it.”). However, it is unclear how, if at all, Galloway will apply in the public 
school context; the Court’s Establishment Clause jurisprudence has always been more strictly 
separationist with respect to public classrooms than in other areas, and its actions thus far suggest 
a disinclination to revisit the school prayer issue after Galloway. See Elmbrook Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 
No. 12-755, slip op. 1, 2 (U.S. June 16, 2014) (denying petition for certiorari in a case presenting 
an Establishment Clause challenge to school district’s practice of holding high school graduation 
ceremonies in a church). 
 159. See Lain, supra note 59, at 27. 
 160. See, e.g., 1 Douglas Laycock, A Survey of Religious Liberty in the United States, in 
RELIGIOUS LIBERTY: OVERVIEWS AND HISTORY 272, 274–90 (2010); Jesse H. Choper, The 
Unpredictability of the Supreme Court’s Doctrine in Establishment Clause Cases, 43 WAYNE L. 
REV. 1439 (1997); Daniel O. Conkle, Toward A General Theory of the Establishment Clause, 82 
NW. U. L. REV. 1113 (1988); Mark W. Cordes, Prayer in Public Schools After Santa Fe 
Independent School District, 90 KY. L.J. 1 (2002); Christopher L. Eisgruber, Madison’s Wager: 
Religious Liberty in the Constitutional Order, 89 NW. U. L. REV. 347 (1995); Debbie Kaminer, 
Bringing Organized Prayer in Through the Back Door: How Moment-of-Silence Legislation for 
the Public Schools Violates the Establishment Clause, 13 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 267 (2002); 
Paul G. Kauper, Prayer, Public Schools and the Supreme Court, 61 MICH. L. REV. 1031 (1963); 
Louis H. Pollak, Foreword: Public Prayers in Public Schools, 77 HARV. L. REV. 62 (1963); 
Stephen D. Smith, Constitutional Divide: The Transformative Significance of the School Prayer 
Decisions, 38 PEPP. L. REV. 945 (2011); Geoffrey R. Stone, In Opposition to the School Prayer 
Amendment, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 823 (1983); Arthur E. Sutherland, Jr., Establishment According 
to Engel, 76 HARV. L. REV. 25 (1962). 
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studies have examined the degree of compliance with the Court’s school prayer 
decisions. These studies vary in terms of the methodology utilized and the 
geographic and temporal location of the inquiry, but some broad patterns are 
clear. At the most general level, the response to the Court’s directions has been 
mixed, but on the whole there has been more compliance, much of it 
concededly grudging and minimal, than outright resistance to the Court’s 
mandates. Those studies that search for regional variation in compliance 
patterns find that such variation does exist, with the greatest degree of 
noncompliance found in the South.161 Despite the heated rhetoric of open 
defiance that these decisions have generated, however, empirical studies show 
that most school districts, most of the time, have aimed to interpret the Court’s 
orders in good faith (if not generously) and to comply with their perceived 
legal obligations. At the same time, however, several of these studies highlight 
the difficulties, endemic to much of the scholarship on judicial efficacy but 
often unacknowledged, in defining exactly what “compliance” with a general 
rule articulated in the context of a specific case or controversy means and how 
it is to be measured in real-world situations in which the applicability of the 
Court’s general pronouncement may be less than perfectly clear. 
The first nationwide study of compliance with the Engel and Schempp 
decisions, undertaken by Frank Way, was published in 1968.162 The Way study 
was conducted during the 1964–65 school year on a random sample of 2320 
public elementary school teachers representing 464 schools across the 
nation.163 Teachers were asked to complete survey questions comparing their 
practices of prayer and Bible reading in the classroom prior to the Engel 
decision in 1962 and in the present day.164 The survey responses indicated a 
 
 161. Notwithstanding the undeniable regional variations that the empirical studies discussed 
in this section clearly demonstrate, we feel it important to resist the common tendency to 
analogize the public’s response to the school prayer decisions to the national experience in the 
wake of the desegregation and racial justice cases of the 1950s and 60s. In both cases, public 
opposition and active resistance to the Court’s decisions were greatest in the South. In the case of 
the school prayer decisions, however, this regional difference was a matter of relatively moderate 
degree. Religious observance was common in schools across the nation prior to the Court’s 
decisions, and public opinion was—and continues to be—opposed to the Court’s decisions in 
every national region. In fact, three of the five major cases discussed in Part II—Engel, Schempp, 
and Lee—concerned practices in public schools in the Northeast. The recent case of Ahlquist v. 
City of Cranston ex rel. Strom, 840 F.Supp. 2d 507, 526 (D.R.I. 2012), in which a federal district 
court ordered the removal of a prayer banner from a public high school in Cranston, Rhode 
Island, demonstrates that tensions between popular religious expression and Court-mandated 
neutrality continue to simmer even in the national region where empirical studies indicate the 
highest level of compliance with the Court’s decisions on religion in public schools. 
 162. See Frank H. Way, Jr., Survey Research on Judicial Decisions: The Prayer and Bible 
Reading Cases, 21 W. POL. Q. 189 (1968). 
 163. Id. at 189–90. 
 164. Id. at 191. 
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significant drop in religious observance after the Court’s decisions were 
announced. Whereas 60% of survey respondents acknowledged conducting 
prayer in the classroom prior to the Engel decision, only 28% reported that 
they continued to do so in the 1964–65 school year. The numbers concerning 
Bible reading were similar: 48% of survey respondents reported conducting 
Bible readings in the classroom before 1962, while only 22% reported 
continuing those readings in 1964–65.165 At the same time, decades before 
Wallace v. Jaffree, the Way study reported that the prevalence of “silent 
meditation” in public classrooms had increased by 61% between 1962 and 
1965.166 Consistent with later studies, Way found that a majority of 
respondents reported that the local school district avoided adopting a policy 
concerning prayer and Bible reading in public classrooms, leaving the matter 
to the discretion of individual teachers.167 Also consistent with later studies and 
with the history of the school prayer controversy, Way found that Protestant 
teachers were significantly more resistant to compliance with the Court’s 
decisions in Engel and Schempp than were Roman Catholic and Jewish 
teachers.168 Way also discovered significant regional variations in attitudes and 
practices concerning prayer and Bible reading in public classrooms, with the 
South being “unique” among the national regions in its resistance to the 
Court’s decisions.169 Table 2 reports Way’s results concerning regional 
variations in religious practices in public classrooms before and after Engel 
and Schempp. The South is indeed an outlier, particularly with respect to its 
open defiance of the Court’s mandates in the 1964–65 school year. 
Table 2:  Way Responses Concerning Prayer and Bible Reading170 
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The next assessment of compliance with the Court’s school religion cases 
was undertaken by William Muir, who interviewed twenty-eight individuals in 
school district leadership positions in the “Midland” district both six months 
before and eight months after the Schempp decision,171 concerning their role 
perceptions or “self-images” regarding religion in schools, their policy 
preferences regarding religion in schools, and their attitudes toward law and 
the Supreme Court generally.172 Muir described the process by which disputes 
and uncertainties within the Midland community concerning compliance with 
Schempp were resolved, and how the Midland district implemented 
compliance with the Court’s mandate, primarily through the efforts of two 
prominent local officials: a lawyer and a school superintendent. In Muir’s 
assessment, the Supreme Court’s decisions banning religious exercises in 
public schools created for individuals a tension between their belief in the 
value of religion in education, the value of not allowing a single sectarian 
viewpoint to pervade public education, and the value of respect for Supreme 
Court decisions and the rule of law generally.173 Thus, school administrators 
and teachers deferred to those local officials’ assessment of the Court’s 
mandate to avoid dissonance between their personal behavior and the Court’s 
order. Although Muir’s study does not present a quantitative assessment of 
compliance with the Court’s decisions across multiple communities, it does 
elucidate the process by which divisions within a particular community were 
resolved in favor of compliance with the Court’s direction. As Stuart 
Scheingold observed, Muir’s study illustrates that “[l]egal norms may not 
induce acquiescence; they may not be self-authenticating; but they do seem 
capable of exercising an independent influence on political attitudes.”174 
 
 171. “Midland” is a pseudonym for the otherwise unidentified, medium-sized city in which 
Muir conducted his study. See WILLIAM K. MUIR, LAW AND ATTITUDE CHANGE 2 (1973). 
 172. Id. at 2–3. 
 173. Id. at 122–25. 
 174. STUART A. SCHEINGOLD, THE POLITICS OF RIGHTS: LAWYERS, PUBLIC POLICY, AND 
POLITICAL CHANGE 147 (1974). 
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Likewise, in 1970, Kenneth Dolbeare and Philip Hammond published a 
study of compliance with the Supreme Court’s school religion decisions,175 
following up on an earlier study by Dierenfield on the frequency of devotional 
practices in public schools.176 Dolbeare and Hammond sent questionnaires to 
teachers who had indicated, in response to Dierenfeld, that their schools 
engaged in religious activity as of 1960. They found that, as of 1967, two-
thirds of those who had reported engaging in such practices no longer did so.177 
Compliance was lowest in the South, where only approximately 21% of school 
districts complied with the Court’s rulings, and highest in the East, where 
approximately 93% of respondents reported compliance.178 Conducting further 
qualitative studies of compliance in the “Midway” area, however, Dolbeare 
and Hammond discovered a more complicated picture:  even school districts 
that were “complying” with the Court’s decisions on paper were suffused with 
unconstitutional religious observance in practice.179 Dolbeare and Hammond 
find it curious that, although there was little openly defiant rhetoric toward the 
Court’s decisions and a general understanding among the relevant actors that 
religious observations in public schools were constitutionally impermissible, 
no one took action to bring the Midway schools into actual compliance.180 
They identify four factors contributing to this “banality of noncompliance”: 
first, the lack of a single official with a clear responsibility for imposing 
compliance on wayward schools; second, the tacit ethos of conflict avoidance 
among local elites in the Midland communities; third, the “cognitive 
insulation” among local officials that caused them to misconstrue Engel and 
Schempp so as to justify local practices as compliant with the Court’s 
directions and to maintain a willful ignorance as to exactly what practices the 
schools engaged in; and fourth, the lack of institutionalized channels through 
which local officials could be forced to address the issue.181 
Robert Birkby’s study of Tennessee school districts’ response to 
Schempp182 in the 1964–65 school year highlights the difficulties and 
ambiguities inherent in the concept of compliance with a judicial decision.183 
 
 175. Kenneth Dolbeare & Phillip Hammond, Inertia in Midway: Supreme Court Decisions 
and Local Responses, 23 J. LEGAL EDUC. 106, 106 (1970). 
 176. See Richard B. Dierenfield, The Impact of the Supreme Court Decisions on Religion in 
the Public Schools, 62 RELIG. EDUC. 445, 445–51 (1967). 
 177. Dolbeare & Hammond, supra note 175, at 110. 
 178. Id. 
 179. Like Muir’s “Midland,” Midway is a pseudonym for five unidentified communities in a 
single Midwestern state. Dolbeare & Hammond, supra note 175, at 107. 
 180. Id. at 111. 
 181. Id. at 115–17. 
 182. Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963). 
 183. Robert H. Birkby, The Supreme Court and the Bible Belt: Tennessee Reaction to the 
“Schempp” Decision, in THE IMPACT OF SUPREME COURT DECISIONS: EMPIRICAL STUDIES 110 
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Prior to Schempp, Tennessee state law required Bible reading in public 
schools.184 In the immediate aftermath of that decision, the Tennessee 
Commissioner of Education announced that, in his view, Bible reading in 
public schools remained permissible but left the decision to local school 
officials.185 Birkby found that seventy of the 121 Tennessee school districts 
(approximately 58%) that participated in the study left their policies requiring 
Bible reading in place, deferring to the Commissioner’s interpretation of the 
Court’s decision.186 Of the remaining districts, only one changed its policy to 
expressly forbid Bible reading; the remaining fifty “merely made student 
participation voluntary and left the decision whether to have devotional 
exercises to the discretion of the classroom teacher.”187 While he hypothesized 
that the ultimate effect of delegating the decision to the discretion of the 
individual teacher may have been to preserve the practice of Bible reading in 
many cases, Birkby’s surveys of school district officials in the districts that 
enacted that delegation demonstrated that many viewed their actions as 
conforming to the Supreme Court’s direction. Survey respondents in those 
districts wrote, for example, that “[w]e must conform with Federal law. If we 
are to teach our children to obey laws we must set an example[,]” and “[w]e 
are commanded by the Bible to be subject to civil powers as long as their laws 
do not conflict with laws of God.”188 While we might question the degree to 
which a school district’s simple delegation of the issue to individual classroom 
teachers, with no further affirmative steps to ensure that improper devotional 
activity did not occur, constitutes a good-faith effort to comply with the 
Court’s order, Birkby’s respondents demonstrate a clear and apparently sincere 
self-perception as having met their legal and moral obligations to obey federal 
law. 
Kevin McGuire’s 2009 study presents an updated picture of public 
compliance with the Court’s school religion cases that takes into account its 
later decisions in Lee v. Weisman, Wallace v. Jaffree, and Santa Fe v. Doe.189 
His study consists of a survey, conducted in February 2004, of 252 
undergraduate students at the University of North Carolina Chapel Hill 
regarding those students’ experiences with devotional activities in their public 
high schools. McGuire’s results illustrate the degree of noncompliance with the 
Court’s major school prayer decisions by region. The results indicate 
 
(Theodore L. Becker & Malcolm M. Feeley eds., 1973). See supra note 49 and accompanying 
text for a discussion of the conceptual difficulties inherent in measuring compliance. 
 184. Birkby, supra note 183, at 110. 
 185. Id. 
 186. Id. at 111. 
 187. Id. 
 188. Id. at 116. 
 189. Kevin T. McGuire, Public Schools, Religious Establishments, and the U.S. Supreme 
Court: An Examination of Policy Compliance, 20 AM. POL. RES. 50, 50 (2009). 
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significant regional variations in resistance to the Court’s decrees, with the 
South continuing to show significantly greater resistance than other regions of 
the country (which McGuire represents collectively as the “non-South”).190 On 
the other hand, while the pattern of regional variation remains intact, 
McGuire’s study indicates a significantly greater degree of compliance in 
absolute terms across the board, and particularly in the South, than was found 
by Dolbeare and Hammond thirty-eight years earlier.191 McGuire’s results 
further illustrate the degree to which the interpretation of data on these 
questions is contingent upon the interpreter’s baseline expectations of the 
efficacy of judicial power. McGuire himself is somewhat pessimistic as far as 
the implications of his data for Court effectiveness, describing the degree of 
noncompliance demonstrated by his study as “quite stark.”192 Wald and 
Calhoun-Brown, however, interpret McGuire’s study as indicating that “the 
practices of teacher-led prayer and Bible reading have become rare” in the 
decades since Engel and Schempp were decided.193 Our own interpretation, as 
discussed at greater length below, is that McGuire’s results, both in terms of 
the degree of compliance and the trend toward greater compliance over time, 
cannot be adequately explained by either of the prevailing models of judicial 
power. 
IV.  THE SCHOOL PRAYER CASES’ CHALLENGE TO PREVAILING MODELS OF 
JUDICIAL POWER 
The pattern of opposition and conformity to the Supreme Court’s decisions 
restricting religious devotional activities in public schools pursuant to the 
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment presents a challenge to both of 
the prevailing models of judicial power in the United States. Although the 
Dynamic Court and Constrained Court models disagree about the extent of the 
Supreme Court’s ability to bring about widespread social change, they agree 
that the Court’s ability to affect behavior, however robust or limited it may be, 
is at its weakest when two criteria are satisfied: first, the Court’s decision is 
opposed by a majority (or at least a determined minority) of the public affected 
by its ruling; and second, the Court lacks the active support of the elected 
branches—the keepers of the Hamiltonian “purse” and “sword”—in 
implementing its order.194 Both criteria are quite clearly satisfied in the case of 
the Court’s school prayer decisions, and both models of judicial power would 
therefore predict that the Court’s ability to achieve compliance with its 
 
 190. Id. at 62. 
 191. See Dolbeare & Hammond, supra note 175, at 110. 
 192. McGuire, supra note 189, at 69. 
 193. KENNETH D. WALD & ALLISON CALHOUN-BROWN, RELIGION AND POLITICS IN THE 
UNITED STATES 100 (6th ed. 2011). 
 194. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, supra note 14, at 464; see supra Part II. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2015] THE HALLOWED HOPE: THE SCHOOL PRAYER CASES AND SOCIAL CHANGE 447 
decisions prohibiting religious observance in public schools would be quite 
constrained. But the empirical evidence on the question of compliance with 
these decisions reveals a more complicated picture. Although compliance with 
the Court’s decisions is far from perfect, neither model can adequately explain 
the pattern of compliance that the empirical studies reveal. The Constrained 
Court view as articulated by Rosenberg would predict near total 
noncompliance with the Court’s decisions given the presence of the three 
institutional constraints on the Court’s power and the absence of any of the 
four conditions sufficient to achieve significant social change when those 
constraints are overcome. The Dynamic Court view as articulated by Hall also 
cannot explain the apparent compliance with the Court’s decisions because the 
two mechanisms that it claims explain the entirety of the Court’s power—
verticality of implementation and the decision’s popularity—are absent in 
these cases. Both models, then, must omit some significant source of judicial 
power that can account for the surprising, albeit far from complete, measure of 
compliance that the Court’s school prayer decisions achieved. 
It is clear that the Court, in deciding the school prayer cases, failed to 
overcome the institutional constraints that Rosenberg identifies as impediments 
to effective judicial policymaking.195 Although the Court did overcome 
Rosenberg’s first constraint, the “bounded nature of constitutional rights,” by 
identifying an Establishment Clause right against compulsory religious activity 
in public schools, it was unable to overcome Rosenberg’s second and third 
constraints.196 The Court is incapable of acting independently of the other 
branches of the federal government, or of the states, in these cases because it 
must rely on those authorities’ cooperation in implementing its orders.197 This 
creates opportunities for the other branches to subvert the Court’s goals, for 
example, when Congress focused its attention in the No Child Left Behind Act 
on defining the scope of constitutionally protected religious activity rather than 
discouraging activities the Court had deemed unconstitutional.198 Moreover, 
the Court “lack[s] the tools to readily develop appropriate policies and 
implement decisions” concerning public school policy, thus failing to 
overcome Rosenberg’s third constraint.199 As noted by the studies of 
compliance with the school prayer decisions cited above, implementation of 
the Court’s decisions depended on the planning and cooperation of state 
education officials, school administrators, and teachers. The Court itself lacks 
the expertise or institutional resources to craft detailed policies for individual 
school districts, and it made no efforts to do so in the school prayer cases. 
 
 195. See ROSENBERG, supra note 6, at 10. 
 196. Id. at 10–11, 13. 
 197. See id. at 15. 
 198. See supra note 106 and accompanying text. 
 199. See ROSENBERG, supra note 6, at 21. 
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Rosenberg’s model would thus predict that the Court would be unsuccessful in 
implementing its school prayer decisions. 
Even Hall’s Dynamic Court model, which is more optimistic than 
Rosenberg’s concerning the Court’s ability to effect social change where 
certain criteria are present, would predict that the Court would have little 
success in the school prayer area. Implementation of the school prayer 
decisions relies necessarily on the cooperation of school board members, 
administrators, and teachers; school prayer is therefore a “lateral” rather than a 
vertical issue. Moreover, it can hardly be disputed that the Court’s school 
prayer decisions have been deeply unpopular since their initial decision.200 
These cases are some of the most controversial of the past half-century, and 
unlike many cases that are controversial at the time of their decision, the public 
has not warmed much to the Court’s interpretation of the Establishment Clause 
since Engel and Schempp were decided in the early 1960s.201 This is 
unsurprising in light of the extent to which the culture of the United States is 
suffused with religious belief. James Morone persuasively argues that the 
United States remains a nation in the shadow of its puritanical forebears,202 and 
the furor with which the Court’s initial decisions removing state-sponsored 
prayer from public classrooms was greeted, is consistent with this thesis. 
Religion permeates American political culture to such a degree that Justice 
William O. Douglas—hardly a paragon of religious sobriety himself203—could 
claim in Zorach v. Clauson (1952) that “[w]e are a religious people whose 
institutions presuppose a Supreme Being.”204 The first half of Justice 
Douglas’s statement, at least, seems indisputable as a descriptive matter, and 
the religiosity of American society has not changed much since 1948.205 
 
 200. See supra notes 112–13 and accompanying text. 
 201. Id. 
 202. See JAMES A. MORONE, HELLFIRE NATION: THE POLITICS OF SIN IN AMERICAN 
HISTORY 3 (2003). 
 203. See BRUCE ALLEN MURPHY, WILD BILL: THE LEGEND AND LIFE OF WILLIAM O. 
DOUGLAS 249, 295 (2003). 
 204. Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 313 (1952). Murphy recounts Justice Jackson’s 
speculation that Douglas “appeared to be taking this proreligion position [in Zorach] because of 
his thoughts about the need to win the support of a Catholic constituency for a possible run for the 
presidency later that year.” MURPHY, supra note 203, at 311. 
 205. This is true in a broad sense, not with respect to the details of sectarian distribution. See, 
e.g., CLAUDE S. FISCHER & MICHAEL HOUT, CENTURY OF DIFFERENCE: HOW AMERICA 
CHANGED IN THE LAST ONE HUNDRED YEARS 193 (2006). For example, more than 95% of the 
American public adhered to one of the three dominant traditions of Protestantism, Catholicism, 
and Judaism from the turn of the twentieth century until around 1968, a figure that declined to 
83% by 2000 as religious belief among the American public diversified. Id. at 194. The portion of 
native-born Americans belonging to a Protestant denomination declined from about 80 percent 
around the turn of the twentieth century to around 50% near its end. Id. at 196. However, 
diversification of religious belief has not led to wholesale secularism. Id. at 206. Fischer and Hout 
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Immigration has contributed further to the burgeoning religious diversity that 
spurred the Court’s decision to impose a more strict segregation between 
church and state in the first place, yet those very decisions have mitigated the 
once-significant tensions between sectarian communities as members of the 
Judeo-Christian tradition have united against the forces of secularism.206 Thus, 
Rick Santorum, running for the Republican presidential nomination in 2012, 
could claim to have “wanted to throw up” reading John Kennedy’s 1960 
speech assuring the American public that, if elected president, he would not be 
influenced by the views of the Vatican on public policy.207 For Santorum, 
unlike Kennedy, Catholicism is no longer a political liability; as the spectrum 
of American faith traditions has expanded, religious conservatives’ in-group 
identification has concomitantly broadened, and the degree of suspicion with 
which members of non-Protestant religious sects are viewed has diminished.208 
 
“concur” with earlier assessments that “[c]ontrary to received wisdom in social science and the 
mass media, [there is] no evidence of religious secularization as measured by the attendance at 
religious services in the United States over the past half-century.” Id. 
 206. Jeffries & Ryan, supra note 52, at 302–04, 348–49. 
 207. Felicia Sonmez, Santorum Says He ‘Almost Threw Up’ After Reading JFK Speech on 
Separation of Church and State, WASH. POST (Feb. 26, 2012, 11:54 AM), http://www.washington 
post.com/blogs/election-2012/post/santorum-says-he-almost-threw-up-after-reading-jfk-speech-
on-separation-of-church-and-state/2012/02/26/gIQA91hubR_blog.html. 
 208. In the interest of mitigating what will undoubtedly be an oversimplification of complex 
historical dynamics in any case, we acknowledge that the ideological trends among America’s 
dominant faith traditions have not been uniformly in the direction of ecumenical cooperation. 
Sarah Gordon claims that “[t]he legacy of the prayer decisions has been division, despite the 
Court’s emphasis on divisiveness as a dangerous consequence of the failure to separate church 
and state,” GORDON, supra note 54, at 93, while Jeffries and Ryan emphasize the “schism” 
between mainline and evangelical Protestants over the question of church and state separation 
since the mid-twentieth century. Jeffries & Ryan, supra note 52, at 328. If this is so, it is only part 
of the story. It is undeniable that intra-sectarian divisions on questions of political and social 
policy have become commonplace in the decades since the Court’s school prayer decisions. 
Wilcox and Jelen cite a number of theorists who “see the religious diversity of America distilling 
into two divergent forces engaged in a ‘culture war’ to influence American values and policy” 
during this period. Clyde Wilcox & Ted G. Jelen, Religion and Politics in an Open Market, in 
RELIGION AND POLITICS IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE: THE ONE, THE FEW, AND THE MANY 
289, 295 (Ted G. Jelen & Clyde Wilcox eds., 2002). Mainline Protestants and liberal Jews and 
Catholics have largely aligned with secularists and other members of the left wing in supporting a 
strong separation of church and state, as well as such social policies as the freedom of 
reproductive choice, opposition to racial and gender-based discrimination, and, more recently, the 
movement for gay rights and marriage equality. Id. at 295, 307–08 Evangelical Protestants, 
conservative Catholics, and Orthodox Jews have largely occupied the other side of all of these 
debates, advocating for a less rigid division between church and state. Id. at 296. Wilcox and 
Jelen note that while conservative Judeo-Christian denominations remain divided by “highly 
salient” doctrinal issues, they are nevertheless capable of cooperating “in political organizations 
that fight abortion, or on behalf of political candidates who promote traditional family values.” Id. 
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While increasing religious diversity has softened some sectarian rivalries, 
Americans’ suspicion of irreligion remains largely unmitigated. Although a 
distinct strand of secularism has existed in counterpoise to the dominant 
religiosity of American culture since the nation’s founding,209 those professing 
no theistic belief remain a small segment of the population—estimated to 
comprise approximately 10.3% of the American public as of 2008.210 In 
addition to this numerical disparity, nonbelievers remain among the most 
distrusted groups by the American public.211 According to Gallup polling data, 
49% of respondents in 2011 would refuse to vote for their party’s nominee for 
president if that person were an atheist, making “atheist” by far the most 
distrusted category.212 In comparison, a “gay or lesbian” nominee, the next 
most distrusted category, would be refused by only 32% of respondents, while 
a Mormon nominee—the next most distrusted religious category—would be 
refused only by 22% of respondents.213 And the public’s distrust of the 
irreligious is not limited to the narrowly political arena. A sociological study 
by Edgell et al. notes that atheists rank highest, by considerable margins, in 
survey responses in which respondents are asked to identify the group “[that] 
does not at all agree with my vision of American society” as well as the group 
of which respondents would disapprove of their child marrying a member.214 
They argue that this distrust is grounded not in the specific beliefs of individual 
atheists that respondents have encountered but rather with the identification of 
the atheist as one who transgresses the foundational premises of civil society, 
finding that “Americans construct the atheist as the symbolic representation of 
one who rejects the basis for moral solidarity and cultural membership in 
 
Nevertheless, we maintain that this transition in emphasis from sectarian identity to political 
ideology marks a historic shift in relations among the major faith traditions. 
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 214. Penny Edgell, Joseph Gerteis & Douglas Hartmann, Atheists as “Other”: Moral 
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American society altogether.”215 Given that construction, the resilience of 
Americans’ opposition to the Supreme Court’s perceived secularization of the 
public school system in the line of cases beginning with Engel and Schempp is 
hardly surprising.216 
The American public’s deep aversion to irreligion likely explains why the 
Court’s decisions also received little support from the elected branches of the 
national government, whose institutional responses have ranged from 
lukewarm acquiescence to outright defiance of the Court’s decrees. Unlike the 
Court’s controversial school desegregation cases, as to which Rosenberg 
argues the active support of Congress and the president was essential to the 
degree of success that the Court eventually achieved, no other branch of 
government has shown any enthusiasm for supporting the Court’s position on 
the issue of prayer and devotional observance in public schools in the decades 
since the first of these cases was decided. To the contrary, Democratic and 
Republican politicians have generally agreed that the Court’s decisions are too 
secular in setting forth a vision of relations between religion and government 
in the context of public education, distinguished primarily by the intensity of 
that conviction and the distance to which they believe the line should be moved 
back in favor of increased religious observance in the public classroom. 
Congress’s institutional responses to the Court’s decisions have been largely 
hostile, aimed at reversing the Court through constitutional amendment or, 
failing that, limiting the impact of the Court’s rulings through the funding and 
guidance provisions of the NCLB in order to preserve the greatest legally 
permissible zone of liberty for religious observance in public schools. Indeed, 
the best that can be said of the elected branches’ cooperation with the Court in 
this area is that, on occasion, a well-placed supporter of the Court’s position 
has succeeded in utilizing one of the numerous veto points in the legislative 
process to prevent legislative action adverse to the Court’s rulings, as was the 
case, for example, when Representative Emmanuel Celler (D-NY) utilized his 
position as Chairman of the House Judiciary Committee to delay and 
eventually derail the Becker Amendment in 1964.217 In short, and with a few 
notable exceptions, American politicians have long seen association with 
atheism or secularism as a losing proposition for their career prospects, and 
have been quite reluctant, whatever their personal views on the matter, to risk 
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being perceived as advancing the cause of irreligion in the public sphere, 
including public education. The Court’s highly separationist interpretations of 
the Establishment Clause have thus far escaped reversal by constitutional 
amendment largely on the basis of the significant institutional advantage 
enjoyed by the status quo in the American constitutional system, 
notwithstanding significant popular and political support for such an 
amendment. 
It is thus hardly surprising that the Court’s decisions restricting the 
commingling of religious observance with secular education in the public 
schools were met with a high degree of public opposition, or that compliance 
with the Court’s decisions in public classrooms has been less than perfect. 
Perhaps even more so than its infamously controversial decisions on racial 
desegregation, the Court’s school prayer decisions—at least to the extent that 
they were associated in the public eye, fairly or not, with the advance of 
atheism—struck at a foundational premise of Americans’ perception of 
themselves as a people. What is much more surprising, then—and unexplained 
by either Rosenberg’s Constrained Court model or Hall’s version of the 
Dynamic Court view—is that, in the face of this public outcry and in the 
absence of more than tepid support from a few elected officials, the Court’s 
decision was nevertheless broadly implemented even in some localities in 
which public sentiment was strongly opposed to a strict separation of religious 
and secular education. Compliance was certainly not perfect, and school 
districts sometimes self-reported compliance based on erroneous or willful 
misunderstandings of the content of the Court’s decisions, but even these 
incomplete measures indicate the extent to which local officials feel compelled 
to present at least the appearance of compliance. The question of why, in the 
face of public opposition and the absence of any direct enforcement measures 
by the Court, these officials felt so compelled is a difficult one for either of the 
prevailing models of judicial power to explain. We will turn to that question in 
the next section. 
V.  LESSONS FROM THE SCHOOL PRAYER DECISIONS: OMISSIONS AND 
OVERSIGHTS IN THE CONSTRAINED AND DYNAMIC COURT MODELS 
The degree of compliance with the Supreme Court’s rulings in the area of 
religion in public schools notwithstanding determined popular opposition and 
the Court’s relative lack of an enforcement apparatus calls into question the 
Hamiltonian assumptions about the nature of judicial power that lie at the 
foundation of both models of judicial authority. In particular, the broad 
acquiescence to the Court’s anti-establishment cases notwithstanding 
widespread and persistent public disapproval demonstrates that the Court is 
capable of overcoming its institutional constraints to produce social change in 
ways that neither Rosenberg nor Hall fully articulate. It is not our intention 
here to offer a fully formed alternative model of judicial power to supplant 
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those of Rosenberg and Hall, but rather to suggest, on the basis of the 
foregoing case study as well as existing socio-legal scholarship on legal 
compliance, additional mechanisms that could account for the pattern we 
observe and offer a more accurate model of courts’ capacity to effect 
substantial social change in other cases. 
The broad question of when, and whether, landmark judicial decisions are 
capable of effecting widespread social change cannot be resolved with an 
acceptable degree of precision through a single case study. However, we 
believe that the school prayer decisions offer a compelling counterpoint to 
Rosenberg’s claim that courts are “almost never” capable of effecting 
significant social change, or that they can do so only when the four 
institutional constraints that Rosenberg identifies are overcome and one of the 
necessary “conditions” are met.218 Our review of the empirical studies of 
compliance with the school prayer decisions suggests that the Constrained 
Court model fails to recognize at least one instance in which the Court has 
been able to achieve widespread though imperfect compliance with its orders 
without the support of the other branches of the federal government and in 
spite of popular opposition to the Court’s separationist interpretation of the 
Establishment Clause. 
The Dynamic Court view, broadly defined as the view that courts can 
effect social change in more than a narrowly constrained set of circumstances, 
seems better able to account for the degree of public compliance with the 
school prayer decisions; but advocates of the Dynamic Court view have failed 
to explain satisfactorily the mechanisms by which the Court can create social 
change on a national scale, leaving them especially vulnerable to 
methodologically sophisticated attacks by critics like Rosenberg.219 Among 
proponents of the Dynamic Court model, only Matthew Hall has attempted to 
articulate a fully fledged model of judicial power to rival Rosenberg’s 
presentation of the Constrained Court view. Although Hall’s elaboration of the 
Dynamic Court model, which explains judicial power as a function of the 
verticality and popularity of the decision in question, is more rigorous than 
early critics of Rosenberg who presented no alternative model,220 its inability 
to account for the level of compliance with the religion decisions suggests 
some yet unaccounted for aspects of the Supreme Court’s institutional ability 
to induce compliance. While Hall criticizes Rosenberg for “us[ing] up all of his 
degrees of freedom” by “creat[ing] seven rules to explain three events,” Hall’s 
model, although avoiding the statistical over-specification problem, turns on 
two independent variables that lack sufficient explanatory power to predict the 
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pattern of compliance with the school religion cases.221 Accordingly, we 
suggest below some additional factors not considered by Hall or Rosenberg 
that appear relevant to the pattern of compliance observed in response to the 
school prayer cases that may be relevant to the study of judicial power more 
generally. 
The most compelling factor that both Rosenberg and Hall overlook does 
not operate on the level of constitutional structure, but rather individual human 
psychology. Neither Rosenberg nor Hall takes into account the autonomous 
normativity of law qua law—that is, the tendency of legal norms, simply by 
virtue of their status as legal norms, to motivate compliance independently of 
the subject’s personal views of the wisdom or morality of particular legal rules. 
This phenomenon is explored in depth in Tom Tyler’s psychological studies of 
legal compliance. In an influential study, Tyler conducted a panel study in 
which an initial cohort of 1575 residents of Chicago were administered a 
telephone survey regarding their attitudes toward legal obligations and 
compliance; of that group, 804 were selected for a follow-up survey one year 
later.222 Tyler’s survey experimentally contrasts the “instrumental” view of 
compliance, which holds that individuals comply with legal rules only because 
it is in their immediate self-interest to do so, with the “normative” view that 
compliance is motivated to some degree by the perceived legitimacy of law—
its capacity to impose moral obligations to obey that transcend immediate self-
interest.223 Tyler’s results lend strong support to the “key implication” of his 
work: “that normative issues matter.”224 For example, survey respondents in 
Tyler’s study showed a remarkable tendency to moralize compliance even with 
legal offenses typically classified as mala prohibita such as speeding, littering, 
and illegal parking.225 Moreover, a “striking” majority of respondents—82%—
agreed that “[people] should obey the law even if it goes against what they 
think is right.”226 Tyler concludes that the normative model better describes 
compliant behavior insofar as individuals are motivated to comply with legal 
authorities that they deem “legitimate” without reference to whether 
compliance advances their narrow self-interest in specific cases.227 
An adequate model of judicial power must take into account the normative 
force of law qua law in motivating compliance even when the subjects of law 
may disagree on normative grounds with the policy that the law prescribes. 
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Indeed, the normative force of law is seen in some of the empirical studies of 
compliance with the school prayer decisions as a factor motivating compliance 
in communities that disagreed strongly with the Court’s anti-establishment 
position. In Birkby’s study, for example, respondents emphasized the 
importance of “set[ting] an example” for children and “obey[ing] [Federal] 
law” in explaining their decision to comply with the Court’s rulings 
notwithstanding their disagreement with the Court’s separationist vision of the 
relationship between religion and public education.228 This effect may be 
reinforced by religious norms mandating deference to “civil authority” where 
such authority does not conflict with religious obligations.229 Muir’s study 
likewise suggests that the force of legal authority can create normative 
imperatives notwithstanding individuals’ disagreement with the Court’s policy 
decisions.230 Of course, the normative force of law can be outweighed by other 
factors, and individuals may vary significantly in the extent to which they 
ascribe moral force to legal edicts.231 Nevertheless, the available evidence 
suggests that the law’s moral legitimacy may play an important role in 
motivating compliance even with unpopular rulings that the Court lacks the 
institutional capacity to directly enforce. 
A more institutionally oriented perspective might emphasize the extent to 
which the Court’s decisions strengthen the hand of minority groups 
“[b]argaining in the [s]hadow of the [l]aw.”232 That is, the Court’s declaration 
of a legal norm provides a political and rhetorical resource upon which 
advocates of change may rely to advance their preferred policy outcomes even 
in the face of majoritarian opposition.233 Even where a majority of the 
community might prefer to defy the Court and maintain a policy of prayer, 
Bible reading, or other religious observance in public schools, the Court’s 
decisions enable dissenting minority groups to credibly threaten protracted 
litigation against local district officials who refuse to bring their policies into 
compliance with controlling legal norms. Even aside from the possibility of an 
eventual court order mandating policy changes, the threat of litigation itself 
can be a motivating factor insofar as litigation makes the decision to resist the 
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Court’s order more costly.234 In addition to the direct financial costs that 
defending a lawsuit imposes on the school district, the litigation process may 
subject the district and individual officials to potentially uncomfortable media 
scrutiny and can distract those same officials from other duties as they must 
invest time and attention on communicating with counsel and gathering 
information in response to discovery requests. This suggests a longer-term 
mechanism whereby the Supreme Court’s decisions may shift the political 
balance of power in local politics and embolden dissenting minority groups to 
press their demands for change backed by the credible threat of costly and 
inconvenient litigation.235 Consistent with this view, then, it is conceivable that 
the Court’s orders in the school prayer cases created a sense of “entitlement” 
among the community of parents opposed to religious exercise in schools that 
empowered and mobilized them to seek change in their local communities. 
This could account for the slow but steady rate of increasing compliance 
reflected in the estimates of Dolbeare and Hammond236 and McGuire.237 
Timothy Lytton’s account of the impact of sex abuse litigation in bringing 
about institutional reform within the Catholic Church offers an account 
consistent with Mnookin and Kornhauser in its emphasis on the indirect effects 
of judicial decisions in effecting widespread change, but it focuses less on the 
effect of judicial power in equalizing differentials in political power than on its 
effects in overcoming bureaucratic inertia.238 “In contrast to Rosenberg’s 
sweeping claim,” writes Lytton, “litigants in clergy sexual abuse litigation 
were effective in producing major policy changes within the Catholic Church 
and among law enforcement, and smaller but still significant policy changes 
within state legislatures across the country.”239 Lytton offers several 
mechanisms in his account of how litigation achieved institutional change in 
the Catholic abuse cases: “litigation framed the problem of clergy sexual abuse 
as an issue of institutional failure, placed that issue on public and institutional 
agendas, and generated information essential to addressing it.”240 Courts, in 
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other words, are effective in generating publicity and bringing otherwise 
unavailable information into public view. While the mechanisms Lytton posits 
work well in the case of clergy sexual abuse, in which the plaintiffs’ 
allegations once established as credible were met with nearly universal 
outrage, we wonder whether they would be similarly effective in cases in 
which the plaintiffs’ position is broadly unpopular. While Lytton explains that 
the Catholic Church and related groups have argued with some limited success 
that clergy sexual abuse is a matter best handled internally by the church, there 
is no pro-sex abuse lobby opposed to the plaintiffs’ position in these cases; the 
same cannot be said for cases involving school prayer, desegregation, and 
many others discussed by Rosenberg and Hall. 
Another factor that judicial impact scholars have not yet considered is that 
the Court’s power may be greater where structural alternatives to compliance 
exist. This is best illustrated by an example: In the school religion cases, the 
Court’s rulings only prohibited students from engaging in school-sanctioned, 
religious activities in public schools; however, as President Kennedy observed 
in the immediate aftermath of Engel, students remained perfectly free to 
engage in such activities elsewhere, including at home, at church, or in private 
schools. The availability of these alternatives helps explain why, although 
public opposition to the Court’s school religion decisions has remained 
consistently high, public schools faced less pressure to resist the Court’s orders 
than Hall’s model predicts. Many parents who were moderately opposed to the 
Court’s decision likely found home and church sufficient alternative venues for 
religious instruction, and those who were most intensely opposed opted out of 
the public education system entirely in favor of private religious or home 
schooling, in which the Court’s rulings posed no obstacle. In fact, the Court’s 
school prayer decisions are largely credited with initiating the movement 
toward non-Catholic private religious education in the United States.241 The 
availability of alternative venues for religious activity thus contributed to 
public acceptance of the school religion decisions by providing those private 
citizens most inclined to resist the Court’s ruling with an opportunity to 
comply without violating their deeply held moral and religious beliefs. 
Other mechanisms may present themselves upon further study. We 
propose the above mechanisms as neither necessary nor sufficient, but simply 
illustrative of the possibilities implied by the literature on this subject and yet 
unaccounted for by the currently prevailing models of judicial impact. 
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CONCLUSION 
The debate about the nature of the Supreme Court’s power has endured for 
more than two hundred years, and it may well continue for two hundred more. 
But by exposing an apparent contradiction in both of the prevailing models of 
Supreme Court power—the religion-in-schools cases—and proposing several 
alternative and unexamined mechanisms through which the Supreme Court can 
bring about social change, this Article moves the conversation between 
modern-day Federalists and Anti-Federalists substantially forward. Neither the 
Constrained nor Dynamic Court view, as we demonstrate here, are capable of 
fully explicating the way in which the Supreme Court can and does engender 
social change; ironically, though, both theories, while in almost total 
disagreement, are in this case wrong in precisely the same way. 
In our effort to expose this critical shortcoming of the two prevailing 
models of judicial power, we make several additional contributions to the 
relevant legal literature. First, we introduce to the Rosenberg-Hall debate 
important insights gained from other literatures, including the socio-legal and 
political science literatures. We suggest, for example, that the Court’s power, 
in some cases, is a function of individual- and societal-level beliefs and 
perceptions that often have little or nothing to do with the actual substance of 
the Court’s decisions or its institutional resources. Second, we demonstrate that 
the judicial impact literature’s failure to pin down the meaning of 
“compliance”—the standard against which the Court’s success or failure is to 
be measured—makes it difficult to have a constructive conversation, and near-
impossible to answer the questions in which most students of judicial impact 
are interested. 
The effort to understand the role of and constraints on courts in the United 
States is much more than an academic exercise. Resorting to the court system, 
though exceedingly common in the United States, is resource intensive in 
terms of time, money, and manpower—resources that many of those people 
and institutions appealing to courts to effect their preferred outcomes tend not 
to have in sufficient quantities. And this pattern of relying on courts to solve a 
nation’s most thorny social problems, according to Robert Kagan and Charles 
Epp, has been exported to and adopted by other countries in recent decades. It 
is critical for those who seek to effect social change on a grand scale to have 
realistic expectations as to what litigation and courts, in general, can and 
cannot be expected to accomplish. That is to say, if, as Rosenberg suggests, 
courts cannot deliver on their promise to effect social reform, then activists 
should re-allocate their resources and re-think their court-centric strategies. 
Although we believe that Rosenberg’s analysis leaves much to be desired, 
neglecting to consider important ways in which courts can bring about social 
change, we recognize that the question of judicial impact has not been, and nor 
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can it be, resolved through one case study, however robust or compelling it 
may be. 
Moreover, understanding the nature of judicial power, in addition to being 
of practical consequence for change-seekers, is essential to understanding 
some of this nation’s most treasured institutions, as well as its history. For 
example, at the heart of Rosenberg’s The Hollow Hope and the debate that 
erupted after its publication in 1991 is a question about the Supreme Court’s 
role in ending segregation, and to a lesser extent, advancing women’s, criminal 
defendants’, and LGBT persons’ rights. Rosenberg’s pronouncement that the 
Court is a “hollow hope” under all but the most limited circumstances stirred 
up the academic and legal communities because it represented a rejection of 
the conventional wisdom about what works, and further, because it represented 
a rejection of the conventional wisdom about ourselves. In short, we cannot 
hope to understand our past if we do not first understand our foundational 
institutions. 
In sum, although we do not here identify the precise contours of American 
courts’ power, the above analyses demonstrate that those institutions are far 
more capable of producing social change than the conventional wisdom would 
suggest. Thus, though we must continue to study the judiciary’s impact on 
society to fully understand it, those who seek to realize social reform through 
the courts would be unwise to abandon them now. 
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